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Preface
This book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary
in Europe. Do citizens and judges see it in the same way? Do judges feel
that their independence is respected by the users of the courts, by the
leadership of the courts and by politicians? Does the population trust the
judiciary more than other public institutions, or less? How does indepen-
dence of the judiciary work at the national level and at the level of the
European Union? These interrelated questions are particularly relevant in
times when the independence of the judiciary is under political pressure
in several countries in the European Union. The judiciary may not have
direct democratic legitimacy, but how the judiciary and its core value,
independence, are perceived in society is still—or even more so—impor-
tant. At the end of the day, these perceptions determine popular support
of the judiciary in society, and thereby its position in the trias politica.
Surveys among judges, lay judges and lawyers—in addition to regular
surveys among the general public organized by the European Commis-
sion—provide a wealth of information to answer all of these questions.
The surveys were conducted by the European Network of Councils for
the Judiciary (ENCJ), encompassing all countries that participated in its
work, whether or not these countries have councils for the judiciary.
The surveys are a part of the ENCJ’s efforts to improve independence
and accountability of the judiciaries of Europe, by setting standards and
measuring the realization of these standards, as well as measuring inde-
pendence and accountability in general. The survey among lawyers was
v
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organized together with the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe
(CCBE).
These instruments were developed in a project I coordinated, on behalf
of The Netherlands Council for the Judiciary. At that time, I was director
of The Netherlands Council. This book was not commissioned by the
ENCJ and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the ENCJ, and
neither does it reflect the opinion of The Netherlands Council for the
Judiciary. I wrote this book in my capacity as professor of Empirical
Analysis of Legal Systems at the Montaigne Centre for Rule of Law
and Administration of Justice of Utrecht University. The book combines
the outcomes of the surveys that have been conducted in this field. Its
approach is primarily descriptive. It presents descriptive statistics, and
occasionally some linear regressions, primarily for the purpose of illustra-
tion. I hope the analysis presented here is accessible to a broad audience.
This is a first step, and further research is needed into the underlying
mechanisms of the formation of perceptions of judicial independence.
I would like to thank the colleagues from the judiciaries of Europe
that participated in the development and execution of the ENCJ-surveys,
and in particular past and present presidents of the ENCJ, Geoffrey Vos,
Nuria Diaz Abad, Kees Sterk and Filippo Donati, and the director of the
ENCJ, Monique van der Goes. The survey among lay judges was made
possible by Wiggo Storhaug Larssen. I would like to thank Sarah Koolen,
in particular, for doing much of the organizational work on the surveys.
Chapter 4 of this book contains joint work with Bart Diephuis and Frank
van Tulder of The Netherlands Council for the Judiciary. I would like to
thank Bart Diephuis for additional statistical analyses. And finally, I would
like to thank the ENCJ and the Montaigne Centre for covering the costs
of open access.
Utrecht, The Netherlands Frans van Dijk
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Abstract The central question that this book will try to answer is whether
there is a lack of alignment and—in the extreme—a disconnect between
the judiciary and society in countries of Europe (EU and UK). This
central question is developed into six sub questions. The sub questions
focus on perceptions of judicial independence by various actors, their
respect for independence and the trust of the general public in the
judiciary.
Keywords Judicial independence · Perceptions · Trust
No state can do without a judiciary, but that does not mean that the
judiciary is aligned with the population and appreciated by it. It is gener-
ally believed that a high degree of judicial independence is necessary for
people to appreciate and trust the courts. After all, the fair and effective
resolution of disputes requires an independent and impartial adjudicator,
irrespective of the parties and interests involved. In turn, trust is seen as
necessary for courts to be able to function, if only to incite people to bring
their disputes to court, to cooperate with the court and to accept judg-
ments willingly. The causal relationship between judicial independence,
trust and reliance on the courts puts sharp focus on judicial indepen-
dence as it is perceived by the population and all segments thereof. Courts
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may be fully independent, but if the population does not recognize this
independence, the causal relationship is disrupted.
At the same time, it must be recognized that judiciaries are under
pressure from many sides, whether from parties and lawyers or media
and politics. In particular when judgments are feared not to turn out
the desired outcome, litigants—whether or not they subscribe to the
need for independence in general—have an incentive to try and influence
court decisions in their favour. They do so appropriately, but also inap-
propriately, the latter to the detriment of independence. Governments or
parliaments may not want to surrender important decisions to review by
an independent judiciary, and may attempt to keep some level of control
over the courts. There are many ways to inappropriately influence the
judiciary, and ultimately its judgments might be ignored.
The relative vulnerability of the judiciary in withstanding pressure
and fulfilling its role has been stressed often. The classic reference is to
Hamilton, who argued that the judiciary is the weakest of the three state
powers: judges only make decisions in disputes that are put to them, and
the judiciary itself does not implement or enforce the decisions (Hamilton
2009 [1788]). In addition, the judiciary’s functioning can be frustrated
by the other state powers in many ways, for instance by reducing access to
the courts by raising legal or financial barriers, by reducing the funding of
the judiciary and by exploiting their role in appointments of judges and
members of governing bodies such as councils for the judiciary. The other
state powers have the practical means to make or break the judiciary. The
degree of respect for the independence of the judiciary by relevant private
and public actors is therefore an important factor for the level of indepen-
dence in a concrete situation. An actor’s respect for independence reflects
the legitimacy of the judiciary, but also the willingness of this actor to
support the rule of law, even when it is not in his or her direct interest.
Independence of the courts, in combination with the permanent
threats to undermine it, requires judiciaries to be organized separately
from public and private interests, and in particular from the other
branches of the state. This necessary separation creates an autonomous
environment with strong professional culture and traditions, expressed in
professional and ethical standards. The downside is the risk of lack of
alignment and even a disconnect with society. Judges who are compla-
cent among themselves, may miss incentives to connect with parties and
to keep up with society.
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Lack of alignment will show in different perceptions of independence
by judges and other groups in society. Of course, perceptions will always
differ among the general public and diverse groups such as companies,
court users, lawyers and judges, given their different roles, experience and
culture. Alignment is, therefore, a matter of degree. It should also be
recognized that the perceptions of independence by the general public are
influenced by other factors than direct experience. Reporting in the media
and political discourse play a role as well. For instance, in the shift in
some countries in Eastern Europe towards an authoritarian state or a—so
called—illiberal democracy, the independence of the judiciary functions as
a barrier, leading to concerted efforts of governments and state controlled
media to discredit the judiciary among the population. The larger the
lack of alignment between judges and citizens, the easier it becomes for
governments to curtail the independence of the judiciary and to diminish
the rule of law, but also the more difficult the daily functioning of the
courts becomes.
Is lack of alignment a real problem? When asked, the judges of Europe
evaluate the independence of the judges in their country positively. On a
scale of 0 to 10, averages per country range from a moderate 6.5 in Latvia
to a very high 9.8 in Denmark, with an average across countries of 8.5 for
25 countries in 2019 (all these and other figures mentioned in this intro-
duction will be discussed in later chapters). So, judges do not perceive a
lack of independence. If you ask lawyers for their opinion, however, their
assessment of the independence of the judiciary is substantially less posi-
tive. That is the conclusion in all countries that took part in both the
lawyers survey and the survey among professional judges. The range is
between 5.2 in Hungary to 9.0 in the UK with an average of 6.7, consid-
erably lower than the average of the judges. The Eurobarometer survey
among citizens shows even lower scores than the ones given by lawyers.
The Eurobarometer range is between 3.7 and 7.3, with an average of 5.4.
Apart from the question which perceptions are closer to ‘real’ (de facto)
independence, these findings point to different perspectives of judges and
society. Lack of alignment seems apparent between the two.
Weak alignment is also manifest in the extent judges say their indepen-
dence is respected by the other state powers, government and parliament,
and by the media and social media. A broad variation exists among the
member states of the EU, with negative extremes—unsurprisingly—in
Poland (72% of the judges did not feel respected by the government and
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62% by the media in 2017), but also in Romania (58 and 53% in 2019)
and the UK (43 and 52% in 2019).
It could be argued that these findings are not very important, when
trust in the judiciary among the general public is high. Whatever the merit
of this argument, this proves not to be the case. Firstly, the opinion of citi-
zens about judicial independence is closely connected with their trust in
the justice system. This is reflected in the correlation between trust and
perceived independence, as will be discussed. In essence, trust in the judi-
ciary seems to equal trust in the independence of the judiciary. Secondly,
the percentage of respondents that tend to trust the justice/legal system
varies widely from 17% in Croatia to 86% in Finland, with a cross country
average of 52% in June 2019, according to a regular public opinion survey
of the European Commission. Trust is an issue in many countries. On the
positive side, in most countries trust in the judiciary is higher than that
in government and parliament. Across countries, the difference between
trust in the judiciary and each of the two other powers is close to 15%
point. Lack of alignment with society is not only an issue for the judiciary,
but also for government and parliament.
How do we interpret these findings? Multiple explanations of the
differences in perceived independence are possible. In one scenario,
judges are complacent and over-confident about their independence, and
the assessments of the other groups reflect the true state of independence
more accurately. The perception of many judges of lack of respect by
the other state powers, could then be a reflection of over-accentuating
the role of the judiciary in society. In this scenario, the judiciary is
inward-looking and self-protective, a closed community that sets its own
standards. In another scenario, opinions of citizens and business and to
some extent lawyers are unavoidably shaped by the fact that most court
cases have winners and losers. Losses are accentuated, and blamed on
judges that are thought not to be impartial and independent. Opinion
in society is affected by critical reporting of such and other cases by the
(social) media, in some countries in combination with or driven by nega-
tive opinions of governments and parliaments that do not subscribe to
current constitutional principles and may not want to abide with these
principles. In this scenario, the judiciary performs well within the context
provided by the other state powers, but this is not recognized by the
population.
To explore the relative merit of these two scenarios, this book discusses
perceptions of independence, respect for independence and trust, in the
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countries of the EU and the UK. The central question is addressed
whether there is in Europe a lack of alignment and—in the extreme—
a disconnect of judiciary and society and, if so, what causes this. This
is primarily done by analysing the data from surveys. This analysis is made
possible by the recent surveys of the European Network of Councils of
the Judiciary among (lay) judges and in co-operation with the Council
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) among lawyers in Europe.
This data is combined with the outcomes of surveys of the European
Commission among the general public and among companies. To answer
the central question, the following sub-questions are addressed for the
countries that are covered by the surveys.
1. How do the perceptions of judicial independence by judges, lawyers,
court users and citizens and companies compare? As to the general
public and companies, a follow-up question is whether characteris-
tics of the respondents play a role. Taking into account the limited
availability of data about the parties in court procedures, how do
these parties experience independence? (Chapter 3)
2. Can the perceptions of lay judges who as citizens have direct expe-
rience at the bench, and bridge the gap between judges and society,
throw light on the factors that determine the perceptions of citizens?
In particular, how do professional and lay judges interact, and how
does this affect perceptions? (Chapter 4)
3. How do judges experience the respect for their independence by
the categories of actors they interact with: (1) court users: parties,
lawyers and prosecutors, (2) the political system, consisting of
government, parliament and the (social) media and (3) the internal
leadership of the judiciary, provided by the highest courts and by
the governance institutions of the judiciary? (Chapter 5)
4. Given the relationship between perceived independence and trust
in the judiciary by the public and given the generally higher trust in
the judiciary than in the other state powers, how can this differential
trust be understood? Does the multi-level governance structure of
the EU, also with respect to the judiciary, play a role? (Chapter 6).
5. In view of all data, can it be concluded that a lack of alignment and,
in the extreme, a disconnect exists between judiciary and society,
in the European Union in general and/or in specific countries?
And what can be concluded about its causes and effects? Are there
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indications of the stability of the equilibrium of the state powers?
(Chapter 7)
6. Have these findings implications for the functioning of the judiciary
in a democracy? (Chapter 7)
To set the scene, Chapter 2 discusses the main theoretical and empirical
findings in the literature pertinent to these issues, and their implications
for the design of this study.
This study has limitations. The most important limitation is the lack of
differentiation of respondents in the surveys used. It is likely that citi-
zens with different social and cultural backgrounds experience judicial
procedures differently and also perceive judicial independence differently.
Especially, court user surveys could throw more light on these differences
in the future. Another limitation is the focus on descriptive statistics, as
there is a wealth of data to present and analyse. The implication is that to
a large extent explanation and causality have to left to a later occasion.
Reference
Hamilton, A. 2009 [1788]. The judiciary department. Federalist 78. In The
Federalist Papers. Palgrave Macmillan.
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CHAPTER 2
Judicial Independence and Perceptions
of Judicial Independence
Abstract The three key concepts of this study are: perceived judi-
cial independence, respect for judicial independence and trust in the
judiciary. To provide the basis for the empirical chapters that follow,
theoretical considerations are explored. Due to the subjective nature of
independence, perceptions matter. According to European case law, the
appearance of independence needs to be taken into account when the
independence of a court is evaluated. The perceptions held by parties,
lawyers, media, general public and judges are not homogeneous, and
depend on different sets of factors. In the literature, it is widely believed
that the judiciary needs a positive perception of independence to gain
the trust of society. This trust in turn bolsters the legitimacy of the judi-
ciary. Trust and legitimacy are many-faceted concepts. In this study trust
is used in the sense of diffuse institutional trust. Respect for independence
is used as an expression of the legitimacy of the judiciary. These concepts
apply to the national courts and to the courts at the EU/European level.
To understand judicial independence in Europe, both levels need to be
examined in conjunction.
Keywords Judicial independence · Impartiality · Trust · Respect ·
Multilevel governance
© The Author(s) 2021
F. van Dijk, Perceptions of the Independence of Judges in Europe,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63143-7_2
7
8 F. VAN DIJK
2.1 Relevance of Perceptions
of Judicial Independence
Independence is the core principle and value of the judiciary and also
its performance yardstick. This is expressed in many basic documents.
Focusing on Europe, Article 6(1) ECHR states that “in the determina-
tion of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reason-
able time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.
As the current president of the Court of Justice of the European Union
puts it succinctly, “… the principle of judicial independence constitutes
the essence of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection”
(Lenaerts 2020, p. 32). This function of independence follows from
the division of power among the branches of the state to protect citi-
zens in disputes with the state. However, the emphasis on independence
also derives from the raison d’être of the judiciary to adjudicate any
dispute fairly, in a predominantly confrontational setting. The courts take
far reaching decisions about people and their lives. Parties—often very
unequal in resources and power—disagree and quarrel, often in a highly
charged and emotional atmosphere. To put it simply, they want to win
(or at least not lose), and are often willing to go to extremes to achieve
this. This confrontational aspect distinguishes the judiciary from most
other professional organizations, and puts the independence of the judge
at the forefront. A judge cannot be an effective arbitrator if she is not
independent and impartial, and is seen as such by the parties.
Independence is a multi-faceted phenomenon. The case law of the
highest European courts, the Court of Justice of the European Union
and European Court of Human Rights, give insight in what is seen as
particularly important. According to the Court of Justice: “… in order
to establish whether a tribunal is ‘independent’ within the meaning of
Article 6(1) of the ECHR, regard must be had, inter alia, to the mode
of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of
guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body at
issue presents an appearance of independence…”.1 While this statement
does not constitute a definition of independence or a full description of
relevant factors, it provides a useful insight into what is currently on top of
1CJEU, Combined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, Judgment of 19 November 2019, para. 127.
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the mind of leading justices. Appearances is one of them. This statement
also reflects different concepts of independence. The aim of the Court
of Justice is to establish the actual independence of a court in a specific
case. To do this it singles out the mode of appointment of judges and
the existence of guarantees of independence. These aspects are part of,
what is often called, the de iure independence of the judiciary: the formal
arrangements that shape and protect the independence of the judiciary.
There are many more aspects of de iure independence than mentioned
here (see for instance the indicator system of the ENCJ for an exhaustive
list [ENCJ 2020]). The Court also refers to the appearance of indepen-
dence. How parties and others perceive the independence of the judge(s)
in the case at hand is important. The Court of Justice has set a high stan-
dard: regarding guarantees rules should be set “in order to dispel any
reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of
that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests
before it.”2
The prominent role of perceptions reflects the difficulties for those
involved in procedures to establish in a straightforward manner whether
or not judges are independent. Ideally, one would like to establish ‘objec-
tively’ the actual independence of judges as it shows in their behaviour
and decisions: in judges’ behaviour in court (how they conduct hearings)
and, in particular, in their judgments. These judgments should ‘prove’
the extent to which they are being led only by the law, and to this end
are ‘impervious’ to inappropriate external (political and private) pressures
and internal pressures (from other judges and management). This is for
several reasons, apart from the technical nature of legal issues, difficult
to do. Being led only by the law means that political, religious or other
background does not play a role in adjudicating cases. While background
may not play a large role in most run-of-the mill cases (Ashenfelter et al.
1995), it becomes an issue in controversial cases. The Chief Justice of the
US in his reply to criticism of the President of that country on alleged
political bias of a judge who ruled against a migrant asylum order of
the President, expresses this aspiration clearly: “We do not have Obama
judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. What we have
is an extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing their level best to
2CJEU, Case C-216/18, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, Judgment of 25 July 2018, para. 66.
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do equal right to those appearing before them”.3 This goal puts high
demands on the way judges are selected and promoted: selection needs
to be based on merit (knowledge and experience), and not on other (such
as political) considerations. However well this selection is done, reality is
that judgments reflect values anyway. The extent to which judges are able
and willing to abstract from their convictions and their backgrounds is an
empirical question but hard to research, let only be established in the heat
of the court case by the court users in anything close to objectivity.
The second aspect, being impervious to pressure, is equally subjec-
tive. It is made complicated by the qualifier ‘inappropriate’. If it comes
to corruption in its diverse forms, it is by definition that this is inappro-
priate pressure (including temptation), and the relevance of safeguards
against such outside pressure is evident. Otherwise, there will always be
pressure for instance by the media, and undergoing pressure—appropriate
and inappropriate—from all sides and withstanding it, is part of being a
judge. This resilience is to be achieved not by judges isolating themselves
from society, as they are expected to be in touch with society (Warner
et al. 2014). How else can a judge know how deeds that come before the
bench affected society? When external pressure becomes inappropriate is
arbitrary and subjective. Similarly, internal pressures on judges may come
from a court president who puts pressure on a judge to decide a case in
a certain way, but the court president may also enquire about the delay
in a court case or from colleagues who together agree on a guideline for
the penalty for a certain type of crime. Again, what is inappropriate is
arbitrary and subjective.
Given these and other inherently subjective aspects, it is relevant how
judicial independence is perceived in individual court cases as stipulated in
the reasoning of the Court of Justice, but it is also relevant at an aggregate
level to evaluate the independence of the judiciary as a whole. Systematic
measurement is needed for this purpose not only of the perceptions of
the parties, but also of the perceptions of other categories such as lawyers,
media, general public as well as judges themselves. The perceptions of a
variety of actors are relevant in particular because they see different parts
of reality, have different interests and stakes, and are likely to be subject
to different biases.
3Roberts as quoted by AP, 22 November 2018.
2 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND PERCEPTIONS … 11
Perceptions of judges are, for instance, informative about the pressures
they are under, but may be less so to capture whether they are influ-
enced by their beliefs. The perceptions of parties and lawyers are directly
relevant, but their perspectives may be heavily influenced by (expected)
outcomes, while the perceptions of the media are similarly relevant, but
may be biased towards sensationalist reporting. The perceptions of the
general public are likely to be diffuse, but in a democracy essential to
understand the role given to the judiciary in society.
2.1.1 Independence and Impartiality
Independence and impartiality are often used in combination. The already
quoted Art 6(1) ECHR offers an example. The two terms are used next
to each other, and the relationship between the two needs to be clari-
fied here. While independence refers to a general state of mind but also
to institutional arrangements, impartiality relates to the state of mind of
the court (the judge) towards the issues and parties in a case (OHCHR
2003). No prejudice, preference or bias is to be expressed in any way at
hearings or otherwise. As for independence, the case law of the Court
of Justice gives an indication what impartiality entails in the view of the
court:
… impartiality can, according to equally settled case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights, be tested in various ways, namely, according to a
subjective test where regard must be had to the personal convictions and
behaviour of a particular judge, that is, by examining whether the judge
gave any indication of personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and also
according to an objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether the
tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality. As
to the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite apart from the
judge’s conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to
his or her impartiality. In this connection, even appearances may be of a
certain importance.4
4CJEU, Combined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, Judgment of 19 November 2019, para 128.
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The Court of Justice attaches importance to appearances, like with
independence. Independence and impartiality are closely linked and over-
lapping concepts. It is assumed here that the independence of the judge in
a case is a necessary but not sufficient condition for her impartiality in that
case. It is questionable whether the parties can recognize whether a judge
is independent. It is more likely that parties can recognize whether a judge
is impartial or not. Impartiality is then an imperfect indicator of indepen-
dence. In existing court user surveys in as far as these surveys address such
fundamental matters (which they normally do not), the relevant question
is about impartiality (Netherlands, US) or neutrality (Denmark).
2.2 Formation of Perceptions of Independence
The formation of perceptions of judicial independence varies among cate-
gories of actors. Delivering justice differs from receiving justice, and
direct personal experience differs from indirect information through social
networks or the media. To start with the parties, according to the exten-
sive literature on procedural justice the neutrality of the decision maker
is one of four key aspects that determine the fairness of a procedure, the
others being voice, respect and trustworthiness (see the review of Tyler
and Sevier 2013/2014). Thus, the independence and impartiality of the
judge are an integral part of the procedural justice attained by the courts
(also, Grootelaars and van den Bos 2018; CEPEJ 2016). Ideally, proce-
dures are conducted in such a way that also the losing parties are satisfied
with the fairness of the procedure. While they may not agree with the
outcome, they accept the judicial decisions, implement them voluntarily
and support the courts (Tyler and Sevier 2013/2014). The expectation
would be that, if procedural fairness is realized to a high degree, the satis-
faction with the court among the parties that the court ruled in favour of
and among the parties it ruled against would not differ much. This would
then also be the case for perceptions of independence.
Reality is often different. With fair procedures, it may be possible to
achieve—but it is by no means guaranteed—that both parties appreciate
the interaction as fair, and evaluate the experience as positive, irrespective
of winning or losing. This positive experience would lead to an improve-
ment of sentiments among the parties and positive sentiments towards the
court. In other situations, the interaction will be evaluated negatively by
the losing party, strengthening the negative sentiments about the other
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party and creating negative sentiments about the court.5 This extends
to the perception of independence. In addition, when parties lose their
case, they or their lawyers are tempted to rationalize the loss by assuming
that the judge was partial and not really independent. ‘Justice must be
seen to be done’, but do losing parties recognize justice when it is done?
A survey among court users in the Netherlands shows significant differ-
ences between winners and losers with respect to their experience, even if
in both groups most respondents are positive about the experience.6,7 As
losing weighs heavier than winning (Kahneman and Tversky 1984) and
in general negative events weigh heavier than positive events (Baumeister
et al. 2001), it is not assured that what is expressed in surveys is a true
representation of judicial independence. A negative bias is more likely.
While lawyers are partisan as well, they will be less emotionally involved
than the parties, have realistic expectations about what to expect and by
being a lawyer are less put off by complex, formalistic legalities. Their
perspective could therefore be less biased.
As to perceptions among the general public, most citizens have infre-
quent contact with the courts (see Sect. 3.5). As most people do not
have recent, direct personal experience with the courts, the experiences
and beliefs of those who have such experiences, translate into public
opinion about the independence of the judiciary by means of interper-
sonal networks, reporting on social and traditional media and through the
political arena. In the traditional media and social media negative experi-
ences with the courts are likely to be accentuated. This holds for all media
but in particular for what may be called sensationalist media (Johnston
and Bartels 2010). Politicians may react to critical opinions of aggrieved
court users, especially when re-enforced by the media. They may also have
their own agendas with regard to democracy and the balance of the state
powers, which may or may not respect each other’s role. The (dis)respect
shown by relevant actors for the independence of the judiciary is likely
5See van Dijk et al. (2002) on the development of positive and negative sentiments as
a result of social interaction.
6Parties for whom the judgement is (expected to be) favourable are significantly more
often positive about the performance of the judiciary than parties seeking justice for
whom the judgement is (expected to be) unfavourable: respectively, 90% and 62% are
(very) satisfied and 3% and 14% are (very) dissatisfied (Regioplan and Ipsos 2015).
7The CEPEJ 2016 model questionnaire includes for court users a question whether
the court found in favour of the court user concerned (CEPEJ 2016).
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to affect public opinion. While it is the duty of all governmental and
other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judi-
ciary (OHCHR 1985), in reality otherwise can be observed. An example
for the United States was already given. In Europe Poland is a particular
case in point (i.a. Venice Commission 2020). Thus, the perceptions of the
general public about the independence of the judiciary are an amalgam of
influences. It should be stressed that the perceptions of the general public
are particularly relevant as these inform decisions of individuals to bring
cases to court, to refrain from legal action or, if available, to use other
methods of dispute resolution. These perceptions will also play a role in
political decisions about the legal system. Given the function of the courts
in economic interaction, the views within the business sector are similarly
relevant.
Finally, the judges themselves. They have not (or are not supposed to
have) a vested interest in court cases like the parties and lawyers. They
have first-hand experience with the practical implementation of formal
guarantees of independence, the actual pressures (and temptations) on
judges from outside and inside the courts, but also how judges personally
or as a group react to pressure. The downside is, of course, that they
have to evaluate themselves and their colleagues, and, while judges are
trained to be cool observers, whether they can do that when it concerns
themselves or their group is another matter.
To conclude, the perceptions of the categories of stakeholders that
were discussed, are formed by very different mechanisms. As a conse-
quence, their perceptions have different characteristics and biases, and
their combination is necessary to construct a full picture. Together the
perceptions can shed light on the elusive ‘de facto’ independence of the
judiciary. In addition, actors that bridge boundaries are of particularly
relevance here. In Chapter 4 the perceptions of lay judges are discussed.
2.3 Independence, Trust and Legitimacy
There is a widespread understanding supported by empirical evidence
that independence is necessary for the judiciary to gain the confidence
of society and that a high level of confidence bolsters the legitimacy
of the judiciary in the sense of its licence to operate. Confidence and
legitimacy are seen as essential for the courts to fulfil their function. In
the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union that was
already cited about independence in Sect. 2.1, the court continues: “…
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it being added, in that connection, that what is at stake is the confidence
which such tribunals must inspire in the public in a democratic society.”
And similarly with regard to impartiality: “Once again, what is at stake
is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire
in the public, and first and foremost in the parties to the proceedings”.
In the same vein, Lenaerts sees independence and impartiality as neces-
sary for court rulings to enjoy authority and legitimacy (Lenaerts 2020,
p. 31). In these wordings independence and impartiality are instrumental
to achieve the confidence in and authority and legitimacy of the courts.
This is strongly felt by others in the field as well, to such an extent that it
has become a common understanding. It also adds another aspect to the
importance of independence as perceived in society. Before we look into
these causal relationships, we need to discuss briefly the different concepts
used in the literature and their meaning.
2.3.1 Trust and Legitimacy
Trust, legitimacy and related concepts apply to public institutions in
general, but have also been examined with specific reference to the courts.
As Hamm et al. (2011) notes, in the literature about the judiciary in
its connection with society terms like confidence, trust, trustworthiness,
public support, loyalty, legitimacy and felt obligation to obey the law as
well as negatively charged notions like scepticism, cynicism and distrust
are used. These diffuse concepts are often used interchangeably but they
are sometimes defined distinctly. Also, in the vast literature on trust
a variety of types of trust is distinguished, such as dispositional trust
(as a basic individual attitude), interpersonal trust, institutional trust—
in diffuse form (trust in an institution in general) and specific form (trust
in an institution to do something specific such as uphold the law)—and
political trust. To complicate matters, the trust of a person in an institu-
tion may be evolving, depending on information and experience gained.
For instance in the case of the judiciary, if a person has no experience with
the courts or even with government in general, the person will exhibit his
dispositional trust when asked whether he trusts the courts. Once he has
experiences with the public sector, dispositional trust will be replaced by
institutional trust that he will apply to the courts as well. After concrete
experience with the courts, diffuse and specific trust in the courts may
take over (Mayer et al. 2006). Linguistically, some of these concepts do
not travel well: for instance confidence and trust translate into the same
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term in German and Dutch (an easy check is to compare the cited case law
in different languages as available at the website of the CJEU). Relevant
in the current context is also that trust can be defined as perceived trust-
worthiness of somebody or an institution, but can also be seen to relate
to trusting behaviour. The latter involves giving up power to another over
outcomes that are important for oneself. In this approach trust is more
than a passive evaluation without obligation. This interpretation applies
in particular to the interpersonal level (Tanis and Postmes 2005), but
it is also relevant for trust in the courts. This is obviously the case when
deciding to go to court: one gives up willingly or unwillingly control over
one’s situation (see Benesh 2006). A person puts his fate in the hands
of the court, and expects that it gets fair treatment. Finally, trust is also
sometimes used in the sense that an actor is trusted to behave in a certain
way (Mayoral 2017): the actor behaves as expected, for instance by doing
what is in his (narrow) self-interest.
The Court of Justice uses, as the quote before shows, the term confi-
dence in the courts. Confidence is also used in much research about the
US (GBAO 2020; Benesh 2006; Hamm et al. 2011). Public opinion
surveys by the EC use the term trust (EC 2020b). Also in view of the
linguistic issues, trust in the courts and confidence in the courts are used
interchangeably here.
Trusting behaviour in the courts is close to other concepts such as felt
obligation to obey the law (Hamm et al. 2011), but also, more recently, to
respect for the independence of the courts (ENCJ 2019). Both concepts
are related to institutional legitimacy and the public’s compliance with
institutions (Tyler and Sevier 2013/2014). Felt obligation to obey is
either seen as part of legitimacy or as an outcome of legitimacy (Tyler
and Huo 2002; Tyler and Jackson 2014; Gibson and Caldeira 1998). In
an experimental study among students, Hamm et al. (2011) finds sepa-
rable effects on overall confidence in the courts in general of dispositional
trust, trust in institutions, obligation to obey the law and cynicism. In
the following the terms trust/confidence, in the sense of diffuse trust,
and respect for judicial independence as a consequence of institutional
(judicial) legitimacy are used. It is unfortunate that surveys that focus on
negative concepts such as cynicism are currently not available for Europe,
as such data would provide a valuable complement (Tyler and Huo 2002).
While the surveys about independence and respect for independence
among judges, lay judges and lawyers have been developed by the ENCJ
recently, with regard to trust recourse has to be taken to existing opinion
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surveys, and the questions as phrased in these surveys, have to be
accepted. For instance, the opinion survey of the European Commission
asks: “Do you tend to trust the judicial/legal system?” This phrase leaves
very much open. Do respondents answer the question whether courts are
trustworthy or whether they are willing to relinquish control by bringing
their disputes to court? Given the limited experience of citizens with the
courts, answers are also likely to reflect a combination of dispositional
trust, trust in government in general and trust in the courts.
2.3.2 Empirical Relationship Between Independence and Trust
The connection between independence on the one hand and confidence
or trust on the other hand can now be considered. It was already noted
that it is the clear view of the Court of Justice of the European Union
that independence as well as impartiality lead to confidence in the courts.
Empirical studies confirm the connection between independence and
confidence. Benesh (2006) in a key study about the State Courts in
the US, based on a survey by the National Center for State Courts,
hypothesizes that procedural justice, implying a fair arbiter, as well as the
institutional design of the courts related to independence affect confi-
dence, in addition to type of experience (party or juror). In the American
context institutional design concerns whether judges are appointed or
elected. The hypothesis is that elected judges who have to campaign for
election are less independent than appointed judges. Both hypotheses
(procedural justice and independence) hold. Cann and Yates (2008)
finds that judicial elections and judicial campaign contributions under-
mine support for the US state courts. Support is measured by among
other perceptions of the trustworthiness of judges and whether deci-
sions are perceived to be based on facts and law. Citizens are concerned
about costly, partisan election campaigns. Cann and Yates finds that more
independence leads to higher confidence. It finds also that citizen char-
acteristics, race and gender and social capital, play a role. Intriguingly,
greater knowledge of the legal system reduces the perception of court
legitimacy. The study suggest that a realistic view on the functioning of
the court leads to a less positive perception, and confidence evolves into
a more instrumental opinion based on specific outcomes.
Buhlmann and Kunz (2011) examines the impact of the independence
of the judiciary on the confidence of citizens in the justice system by
means of a multi-level analysis for a range of countries, using data from
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diverse sources. The study finds that the perceptions of judicial indepen-
dence in society are formed by actual (de facto) independence and not
(directly) by the formal rules and safeguards that protect the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, de iure independence, and that these perceptions
foster confidence in the judicial system. Contrary to expectations, it also
finds that political and economic ‘winners’ have greater confidence in
the judiciary than ‘losers’, irrespective of degree of independence. The
study suggests that independence gives judges the opportunity to decide
matters according to their ideological views or in an arbitrary way, but
other explanations are conceivable. For instance, ‘winning’ and ‘losing’
may be related to level of education. In the next Chapter the impact
of education on perceptions of independence is examined. It has been
suggested furthermore that there is a causal relationship between the
existence of impartial institutions in a broad sense and generalized (dispo-
sitional) trust, but the evidence is not conclusive (Rothstein and Stolle
2008).
More specifically, Sapignoli (2018) uses the Eurobarometer public
opinion surveys of the EU to find that the perceived independence of
magistrates is strongly correlated with the trust of citizens in the judicial
system, and even more so than the effectiveness of the judicial system in
guaranteeing the rule of law. These opinion surveys will be examined in
Chapter 6. Finally, experimentally the relationship between impartiality as
part of procedural justice and trust has been established (Grootelaar and
van den Bos 2018). As discussed before, independence and impartiality
are closely connected.
To conclude, trust in the judiciary seems to be equal to trust in the
independence of the judiciary. While independence is particularly relevant
for the judiciary (but not only for the judiciary, see below), trust in the
judiciary can be compared with that in the other state powers (Chapter 6).
Having established the link between independence and trust, the state-
ment of the Court of Justice, quoted earlier, requires further attention.
Its underlying premise is that the judiciary needs the trust of the popu-
lation to be able to function. Why is it necessary for the judiciary to be
trusted? Is this trust functional and does it add anything to the perception
of independence? This seems a rather trivial question, but the reasoning
is of some interest. While the importance of trust holds true for the other
powers of the state as well in a democracy, for the judiciary this is often
seen as particularly important. The main arguments are well known: (1)
as mentioned earlier, in most fields of law parties have a choice to bring
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their disputes to court, do nothing or pursue different courses of action,
and, once having gone to court and having received judicial decisions,
the enforcement of the judgments is external to the judiciary, and (partly)
depends on parties accepting the authority of the courts (Tyler and Sevier
2013/2014). This applies to criminal law as well: trust affects willingness
to report crimes and for witnesses to cooperate with the police (Tyler and
Huo 2002; Warner et al. 2014). Also, the acceptance of judgements in
general, even when unpopular, is greater when diffuse support is higher
(Gibson et al. 2005). (2) Lacking direct democratic legitimation and
being dependent on the other state powers in many respects for instance
for funding, the judiciary is vulnerable to encroachment by the other state
powers (Cann and Yates 2008; Rehnquist 2000; Langer 2002). Attacking
an institution that is trusted widely, may undermine one’s own position,
and thus backfire.
While both arguments raise complications which will be discussed in
Chapter 7, the essence that the courts need trust to function, is not
contested in the literature. It is, however, an open question how this
works in practice.
2.4 Behaviour of the Judiciary
to Enhance Independence
The second argument (position in trias politica) reverses the relationship
between trust and independence. A judiciary that is trusted in society,
stands a better chance to get—wholeheartedly or grudgingly—from poli-
tics the independence it existentially needs to function or it is more
immune to attempts of infringement. The judiciary therefore has an
incentive to build trust, in as far as this is within its powers. Given the
link with independence, this is not necessarily doing what people think
is desirable, such as heavier sentences for crimes always and everywhere.
The choice judiciaries face is to build either diffuse or specific support.
It has been shown in a study for the Netherlands that citizens feel that
sentences are too lenient, but that they also think that judges should be
independent, and should decide at they do (de Keyser et al. 2007). Thus,
society wants judicial independence, and that is what is trusted.
This chain of effects from building trust in the judiciary among the
general public to strong support in government and parliament for
the judiciary is not trivial, especially given the decentralized and non-
hierarchical nature of the judiciary. What may work for the public, may
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not necessarily work in politics. These processes are not only occur-
ring with regard to the judiciary. The public sector has seen a—what
is called—agencification (Papadopoulos 2013). Traditional government
bureaucracies have been replaced by single-purpose organizations that
implement specific laws and regulations. These agencies have a high
degree of autonomy or even independence to shield them from partisan
political influence. The development of the literature in political science
about these autonomous agencies is of interest here. A major review
of this literature identifies as an important trend increased attention
for agency autonomy as ‘a dynamic, relational and socially constructed
phenomenon’ (Verhoest 2017). In this approach autonomy, reputation
and trust are linked. It suggests that agencies can gain more autonomy or
defend their autonomy by developing a strong reputation with relevant
actors and by creating a strong network of support for the agency.
This thinking applies to the judiciary as well, while recognizing that
independence is more fundamental for the functioning of the judiciary
than autonomy is for agencies. Obviously, the actual independence of
the courts is not a static characteristic of a legal system (de iure inde-
pendence), as the cases of Poland and Hungary graphically show (e.g.
Coman 2014; Kovács and Scheppele 2018). Strong legal foundations of
independence can be lost in the course of a few years. The case of Poland
in particular highlights that legal safeguards do not always offer protec-
tion, as relevant laws have been changed relatively easily and rapidly there.
Following the reasoning of this political science literature, protection does
not come from existing laws or even the constitution, but from excel-
lent performance for the court users and active policies to build support.
The trust and reputation of the judiciary are then aspects that strengthen
or weaken the position of the judiciary. While active networking would
also be effective, in the judiciary this meets often with resistance, as
courts keep and treasure their distance from other organisations, just
to protect their independence. Still, bar associations and civil society are
often natural allies. However, with these constraints on networking and
lobbying, building trust and support of the general public seems to be
particularly important for the judiciary.
These arguments strengthen the relevance of the subject matter of this
book, as perceptions about the judiciary in society may play an even more
crucial role than laws and formal safeguards. An open question is whether
judiciaries are looking at their position in this way. Do they have gover-
nance structures that allow them to work on their reputation consciously
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and in a co-ordinated manner or can the same results be achieved by
synchronized behaviour of individual judges? These issues are beyond this
book.
2.4.1 Multi-level Governance
In his review Verhoest (2017) emphasizes that the relational aspect of
autonomy also concerns the multi-level governance structure within the
EU. National political decision makers have to take into account the poli-
cies of the EU. As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) put it, nations are
rule-takers rather than rule-makers. Multi-level governance is obviously
relevant for the judiciary in view of the presence of courts at the Euro-
pean level, to which was referred already several times. In the EU legal
order, the hierarchy of institutions, if it is appropriate to use this term,
is stronger with regard to the courts than with regard to the other state
powers, in as far as the mandate of the EU is concerned and it is uncon-
tested. National judges are also European judges and national courts are
decentralized courts, applying EU law and European standards. National
judges ask for guidance of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
In the case of Poland about the independence of the judiciary, the influ-
ence exerted by institutions at the European level on national institutions
is particularly observable, where the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights play an important role next to the
political institutions of the EU (Kovács and Scheppele 2018). This case
is an illustration of the interaction of levels of governance: the Court of
Justice intervenes directly in national policies and legislation, and instructs
the authorities to take measures. At the end of the day, however, if coun-
tries do not abide by its decisions, the court depends on the European
Commission in particular to enforce its judgments. The EC promotes and
tries to maintain the independence of national judiciaries and the stability
of the division of powers in all member states. The Justice Scoreboard of
the EC is an example of a monitoring mechanism (EC 2020a). Given this
structure, the interaction mechanism suggested above repeats itself at the
EU-level. Independence, trust, legitimacy and respect for independence
all play a role. The trust of the national populations in the EU institutions
and the perceptions about the independence of the Court of Justice of the
European Union and European Court of Human Rights are relevant for
the functioning of the whole multi-level system.
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The EU level adds a dimension to the independence of and trust in
the judiciary, as national judges have opinions about the independence of
the EU-courts and have a degree of trust in them, and vice versa. Also,
national judges have views about the independence of judges in other
member states and their trustworthiness. These issues have been dealt
with by others (Mayoral 2017), but also need more data to be gathered.
The focus here is on the actual alignment or lack of alignment of judiciary
and society in Europe, as basis for the judiciary to fulfil its mandate to
provide effective protection of rights using the terminology of the Court
of Justice.
2.5 Alignment of Judiciary and Society
Judicial independence is still often seen as stemming from the formal
arrangements in law and constitution, and as static as long as the legal
provisions remain the same. However, legal provisions are subject to
change, and need to be stabilized, if one wants to maintain them as
they are. The independence of the judiciary is permanently constructed
by the behaviours of many actors, and is inherently dynamic. The simpli-
fied scheme below captures the main concepts. While trust and legitimacy
may be empirically hard to distinguish, there is a case to be made to
distinguish them. One can trust the judiciary fully, and still be of the
opinion that the judiciary lacks legitimacy, in particular democratic legit-
imacy. Also, the judiciary may have democratic legitimacy, for instance
by means of election of judges, but this may affect, as discussed above,
perceived independence negatively, and this impacts trust negatively as
well.
Perceived judicial independence ↔ Trust in judiciary
↕ ↕
Respect of judicial independence ↔ Legitimacy of the judiciary
The main causal direction is probably clockwise, but causality also
runs the other way, as discussed in the previous section. A major issue is
whether the system that is represented by the scheme, is in equilibrium.
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Equilibrium may arise out of virtuous and negative cycles. How equilibria
would look like, and what their stability is, is a huge subject in itself. In
Chapter 7, this subject will be briefly discussed.
It must be emphasized that all four concepts are likely to be specific
for categories of actors. Respect for judicial independence is a clear case
in point. Respect is likely to differ among categories of actors, such
as the court users (parties and their lawyers, prosecutors), the political
system (parliament, government and the media), but also actors within
the judiciary (supreme court, court management and councils for the
judiciary). These categories have different involvements with the judi-
ciary and different interests and motivations. While for politicians respect
for independence ideally means no interference with the judiciary, proper
implementation of judicial decisions, seeing to it that the resources of the
judiciary are adequate and reluctance to criticize the judiciary, and for the
media substantive, factual reporting of court cases and refraining from
personal attacks (such as ‘enemies of the people’), for parties, lawyers
and prosecutors it would mean not to resort to inappropriate behaviours
(attempts to bribe judges, threaten judges), but to implement judicial
decisions if there is the choice not to do so, and to exert democratic
rights to support the judiciary. Within the judiciary itself, respect would
mean for court management and councils for the judiciary not to put
pressure on judges to adjudicate cases, for instance, from an efficiency
point of view. This reasoning applies to all four concepts of the scheme.
However, the availability of data is a limiting factor. Table 2.1 gives the
differentiation that is applied in the next Chapters.
Another aspect of the data is from which perspective perceptions are
measured. One can ask, for instance, citizens about their perceptions of
judicial independence, but one can also ask judges how they think citizens
perceive judicial independence. Taking the perspective of the behavioural
reactions of the judiciary as in previous sections, the perceptions of judges
of how society perceives its independence and whether relevant groups in
society respect judicial independence are particularly relevant. However,
perceptions about perceptions become quickly complicated. In this book
all data are based on first order surveys, except for respect for judicial
independence. It does not make much sense to ask people whether they
respect the independence of the judiciary if one wants to avoid socially
desirable answers, but it makes sense to ask judges whether they feel their
independence is respected, as they experience this directly in the courts.
This leads also to some complications, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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Table 2.1 Overview of perceptions and comparisons (arrows) that are
presented
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The differentiation of categories of stakeholders is an essential part of
this study. The alignment of judiciary and society shows not only in the
extent society in a broad sense is convinced of the independence of the
judiciary and trusts its judiciary, but also in the extent that the percep-
tions of the functioning of the judiciary among judges and (groups in)
society differ. The relevance of differences in perceptions of judges and
the (potential) users of the courts in a broad sense comes to the fore in
particular when judges are much more positive than society about their
performance. Such differences feed the feeling in society that judges are
otherworldly, live in an ivory tower and are protective of their position.
To be satisfied about oneself, while the court users are unhappy, is likely
to have negative consequences for trust. In addition, perceptions drive
behaviour, causing a tendency not to see a need for change within the
judiciary, where others outside the judiciary see this need as urgent. See
Rottman and Tomkins (1999) which notes for the US state courts a large
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difference in the appreciation of the functioning of the courts between
population and judges with judges not seeing a need for change. Finally
and as a consequence, differences may create tensions and strife among
the state powers. Large (unexplained) differences in perceptions of judicial
independence may tempt the other branches to intervene or to strengthen
their grip on the judiciary. In the next Chapters, while filling in Table 2.1,
the focus will be on differences.
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CHAPTER 3
Perceptions of Judicial Independence
in European Countries
Abstract The perceptions of judicial independence of judges, lawyers,
general public and companies are analysed across countries. The percep-
tions of these categories are strongly correlated. However, the mean
scores differ: judges are much more positive about their independence
than lawyers, and lawyers are much more positive than the general
public and companies. As to the general public, highly educated citi-
zens are generally more positive about the presence of independence than
citizens with lower education levels. The difference increases with the
degree of independence. Citizens with little education in very different
countries have similar perceptions of judicial independence. The limited
information that is available about court users suggests that persons
with recent experience with the courts are less positive about indepen-
dence than persons without experience. For companies the reverse is
apparent. Among both the general public and companies, the perceptions
diverge more with experience than without experience, likely as a result
of winning or losing a case.
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3.1 Surveys About Independence
Several surveys about judicial independence are available for countries of
Europe. Table 3.1 provides an overview. These surveys allow a compar-
ison of the perceptions of citizens and companies in general with the
perceptions of lawyers and judges. In this Chapter these perceptions are
compared and analysed. Since 2016 surveys are conducted at the request
of the European Commission annually about the perceptions of judi-
cial independence among the general public and among companies. The
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) has held by now
three surveys among the judges of Europe about their independence.
The latest survey was conducted in February/March 2019. The surveys
Table 3.1 Surveys on judicial independence by category of respondents
Number of
respondents




























Lawyers 4,489 21 Countries with
sufficient response
1 Qtr 2019 Judge




1 Qtr 2019 Judge
Lay judges 20,605 10 ENCJ members
and observers
1 Qtr 2018 Judge
Note The UK participated in all surveys, and is included in the comparisons
Sources
General public: Flash Eurobarometer 474 (EC 2019b)
Companies: Flash Eurobarometer 475 (EC 2019a)
Parties: Flash Eurobarometer 474 and 475 and miscellaneous national surveys
Lawyers: ENCJ and CCBE (2019)
Judges: ENCJ (2019)
Lay judges: ENCJ (2018)
3 PERCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 31
are aimed at professional judges. A separate survey has been carried out
by the ENCJ among lay judges in 2018. The opinions of lay judges
are the subject of the next Chapter. As to the perceptions of lawyers,
at the initiative of the ENCJ the Council of Bars and Law Societies of
Europe (CCBE) has recently organized—in parallel with the latest judges
survey—a survey among lawyers in 2019. The participation of lawyers in
the survey was relatively low and for some countries too low to be infor-
mative, despite the efforts of national bar associations. Given the crucial
role of lawyers in judicial procedures, this is unfortunate, but together
with the other data sources a consistent picture can be constructed.
Then, there are the court users for whom the judicial system exists,
but who are difficult to reach. Some information about their percep-
tions can be derived from the surveys mentioned above at the request
of the EC among citizens and companies, as these contain a question
about their recent involvement in a dispute that went to court. However,
people do not go to court often, and the number of respondents per
country is small, while EU-wide aggregate data are not very meaningful
given the differences among the constituent nations. In addition, only
for a few countries relevant data on the perceptions of court users about
concepts that are related to independence are available, as part of court
user surveys. Court user surveys generally focus on the services provided
by the courts at a practical level, and pay attention to issues such as waiting
times, but in some surveys court users were asked about impartiality (the
Netherlands) and neutrality of the judge (Denmark).
It should be noted that the comparison of the perspectives of the stake-
holders in the judiciary can also be done for an individual country. An
example is an interesting study regarding Montenegro that distinguishes
the same stakeholders as in this Chapter, and involved extensive data
collection (World Bank 2018).
Table 3.2 summarizes the key outcomes of the surveys. As the country
coverage of the surveys does not fully overlap, a full comparison is possible
for 17 countries (left part of the Table). Leaving out the perceptions of
lawyers, 22 countries can be compared (right part). In the notes to the
Table the countries in the two sets are specified. It should be noted that
of the large countries of the EU France and Poland did not participate in
the 2019 judges survey of the ENCJ. France, because of administrative
reasons, and Poland, because it has been suspended as a member of the
ENCJ (2019). Table 3.2 does not include the court users in the sense
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Table 3.3 Summary statistics of the perceptions of judicial independence by
judges and lawyers and by citizens and companies with and without experience,








Mean 8.2 6.7 5.0 5.5 5.7 5.4
Min–Max 6.5−9.4 5.2−9.0 3.5−7.3 3.5−7.3 2.4−8.7 3.2−7.3
SD 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.9 1.4
Correlation
Judges all 1 0.75** 0.54* 0.61** 0.76** 0.501
Lawyers 1 0.60** 0.76** 0.77** 0.68**
Public with
experience











Note Paired sample T -test of means on country level: the means regarding judges and lawyers differ
significantly (<0.01) from the means of public and companies. The means regarding the public
with and without experience differ significantly (<0.05). The other means regarding companies and
between public and companies do not differ significantly (>0.05)
of the parties in procedures, because their experience requires a more
nuanced description (see Table 3.3). The perceptions of the different
actors, starting with the judges, are discussed in the following.
3.2 Independence as Perceived by Judges
The judges of Europe are generally positive about their independence.
The ENCJ survey asked judges of 27 countries to rate their own inde-
pendence as well as the independence of the judges in general in their
country.1 The first question has a personal and narrow scope. The mean
score over all 27 judiciaries was 9.0 on an 11-points scale from 0 to 10.
1Literally: “On a scale of 0-10 (where 0 means “not independent at all” and 10
means “highest possible degree of independence”) as a judge I am …”. Same, but: “the
professional judges in my country are …”.
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49% of the respondents gave their independence the maximum score of
10 and 28% a score of 9.2 Only 4% gave a score lower than 6. The ques-
tion about the independence of the judges in general is less personal
as well as potentially broader, as respondents may take aspects such as
the selection of judges into account. The mean score was lower, 8.3
with ‘only’ 24% of the respondents awarding a score of 10 and 31% 9.
Just above 7% gives a score lower than 6. Looking at the outcomes per
country, the mean scores on own independence range from 7.1 in Latvia
to 9.8 in Denmark and on the independence of the judges of the country
from 6.5 in Latvia to again 9.8 in Denmark.
The correlation between the scores on the two questions is high. They
differ systematically in level, nevertheless. The difference between the
mean scores on own independence and on independence of all judges
increases with the decrease of the mean score for all judges.3 This can
be explained partly by the existence of an upper bound which limits
the possibilities to score one’s own independence when the score for all
judges is already close to the ceiling. Another reason might be unwilling-
ness to express lack of independence at the personal level, for instance for
fear of negative consequences if the guaranteed anonymity of the survey
would be breached.4 Still, it seems that it is not beyond judges to be
susceptible to illusory superiority (Buunk and Van Yperen 1991), which
for instance brings nearly all people to think that they drive their cars
better than the median (Svenson 1981), and also offers an explanation
why lawsuits go to trial (Landes 1971; Posner 1973). While there are
many explanations of this phenomenon, the outcome is likely to be influ-
enced by the context of self with aggregate comparison (Giladi and Klar
2002). Being critical about colleagues may have to do with the actual
observation of colleagues in court and their judgments, but also with
the appointment and promotion of judges. The ENCJ survey shows that
many judges are critical about human resource decisions about judges,
and many respond that these decisions are not solely based on merit (see
ENCJ 2019, p. 33).
2Average of countries, to avoid influence of country size.
3Linear regression at country level: Ind All = 1.4**× Ind Own − 4.3**, N = 26,
R2 = 0.76. Thus, if Ind Own = 10, Ind All = 9.7, and if Ind Own = 8, Ind All = 6.9.
Note: excluding Northern Ireland.
4Respondents were given a link to the ENCJ website, administered in Brussels.
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In view of these explanations, the score for all judges is likely to be
a more truthful expression of actual independence than the score for
one’s own independence. In addition, Table 3.2 shows that the judges’
perceptions about judges in general are more strongly correlated with
the perceptions of lawyers, citizens and companies than the perceptions
of judges about themselves. In the remainder the perceptions about all
judges will be used as yardstick for the opinion of judges. It should be
stressed that this yardstick concerns the independence of the judiciary,
and not the perception of judges of the appearance of independence to
the parties and the public. The question of the survey is explicitly phrased
in this way.
3.3 Independence as Perceived by Lawyers
The survey among lawyers about the independence of the judiciary in
their country includes exactly the same question as the survey among
the judges about the independence of the judges in general. Lawyers are
much more critical about judicial independence than the judges them-
selves. The mean score over the 17 countries with sufficient response rates
is 6.7 with 10% of the respondents giving a score of 10 and 16% a score of
9. 31% allots a score below 6. At country level, the average score ranges
from 5.2 for Hungary to 9.0 for the UK.
The left part of Table 3.2 allows a comparison of lawyers and judges.
The perceptions of judges about the independence of the judges in
general in their country are highly correlated with the perceptions of
the lawyers, while the means differ substantially. This essentially implies
that the surveys reveal very similar, consistent differences of perceptions
between countries, but they also bring out different views about the level
of independence that is achieved.
The mean score by lawyers across countries of 6.7 can be seen as posi-
tive, but much less so than the mean score by judges of 8.2. The lower
the score given by lawyers, the larger is the difference between the mean
score by judges and the mean score by lawyers.5 Compare for instance
Hungary and Sweden. For Hungary the score of judicial independence
by judges is 7.3 and the score by lawyers is 5.2, resulting in a large differ-
ence. For Sweden the scores are 8.6 and 8.2. This phenomenon is similar
to that with regard to the two types of perceptions of judges discussed
5Linear regression at country level: Ind All Judges = −0.5** × Ind Lawyers + 4.8**,
N = 17, R2 = 0.53. If Ind Lawyers = 5, Ind All Judges = 7.3. If Ind Lawyers = 8,
Ind All Judges = 8.8.
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above. While admittedly lawyers form a critical profession, it is not likely
that as a personality trait they are inherently more critical/negative in
Hungary than in Sweden. The only exception of the pattern is Latvia.
The scores of judges and lawyers are very similar (6.5 vs 6.2). Evaluating
the data at individual level for Latvia, reveals that there is no significant
difference between judges and lawyers. For each of the other countries
the difference is significant.6
3.4 Independence as Perceived
by the General Public
Perceptions of the general public are derived from a survey that is
fully devoted to the topic of judicial independence. The Eurobarometer
phrases the question as follows: “from what you know, how would you
rate the justice system in (y)our country in terms of the independence
of the courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good,
fairly bad or very bad”, allowing also “do not know” as an answer. While
the wording and the scale differ, the content is the same as that of the
surveys among judges and lawyers. After transformation to an 11-point
scale, the mean outcome for all 22 members is 5.5 with a range of 2.6
for Croatia to 8.0 for Denmark.7 Table 3.2 gives the scores for the two
subsets that are used to compare the categories of actors. Comparing the
perceptions of judges (about all judges), lawyers and the public, the mean
score drops from 8.2 to 6.7 and to 5.4: lawyers are more critical about
judicial independence than judges, and the general public is more crit-
ical than the lawyers. For some countries this pattern does not affect the
(positive) perception of independence qualitatively (see Fig. 3.1). In these
countries all categories of actors are positive about the state of indepen-
dence (score >5), albeit to a larger or smaller degree. This is the case for
instance for the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. For other countries the
outcomes diverge. For instance, in Spain the score by the judges is 7.8, by
lawyers 6.2 and by the public 4.2. This pattern is also found in Slovenia
and Italy. This puts in doubt the state of independence in these countries:
6T-test. Significance level: 0.1% for all countries except Sweden (1%) and UK (5%). For
Latvia p = 0.18.
7A simple linear transformation was used to transform the five points scale of the EU
barometers as follows: very good: 10, fairly good: 7.5, don’t know: 5, fairly bad: 2.5 and
very bad: 0. Alternative transformations do not alter the outcomes qualitatively.









































Fig. 3.1 Perceived judicial independence by public and judges, average per
country (Note See list of country abbreviations at end of this chapter)
is independence “strong” or “weak”? While such doubts about indepen-
dence may or may not be justified, the existence of negative perceptions
are relevant in themselves, as was argued in Chapter 2.
It should be noted that the perceptions of the public reflect the appear-
ance of independence, as the vast majority misses the knowledge and
information to assess independence by examining the judicial decisions
factually. Table 3.2 shows also that the perceptions of the public are
highly correlated with those of the lawyers and with the perceptions of
the judges. The differences among countries are not in doubt.
Level of education plays an important role in the assessment of inde-
pendence: on average a high education leads to a more positive perception
of independence, and low education to a less positive perception (EC
2019b). See Fig. 3.2. Across countries, the mean score falls from 5.7 for
high education (finished education older than 20) to 5.1 for low educa-
tion (left education younger than 15). The standard deviation for low















































Fig. 3.2 Perceived independence by the general public, by level of education,
average per country
education is smaller than that for high education (1.0 vs 1.6), suggesting
that the latter persons are more discerning. For judiciaries with a very
positive perception of independence by judges and lawyers the effect of
different levels of education on the perceptions by the public is much
larger than in judiciaries with a less positive perception. The difference is
larger, the more positive the perception of independence by for instance
lawyers.8 If independence is compromised, citizens agree on that, irre-
spective of their level of education. If independence is strong, respondents
8Linear regression at country level: Ind Public High Edu − Ind Public Low Edu =
0.72** × Ind Lawyers − 4.04; N = 17; R2 = 0.65. Thus, if Ind Lawyers is 10, the
difference between high and low education is 3.2 points, while if Ind Lawyers is 5, the
difference is −0.4 points.
3 PERCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 39
with a high education recognize this better than respondents with a low
education. For example, in Sweden citizens with high education score
judicial independence at 7.6, while citizens with low education score at
5.5, which should be compared with the score by judges of 8.6 and by
lawyers of 8.2. When perceptions of judges and lawyers are less positive,
the difference is smaller. For instance in Lithuania, the scores are 5.6 and
5.3, to be compared with 7.7 and 5.9 of judges and lawyers.
In several countries where independence is in relatively low regard by
judges and lawyers, the impact of education is reversed. In Romania citi-
zens with high education give a score of 4.2 and with low education 5.3,
and in Latvia 4.9 and 5.4. In Hungary, Slovakia and Greece the same
effect can be observed, but to a lesser degree.9 In all these countries
citizens with low education believe that the judiciary is more indepen-
dent than citizens with a high education. Not surprisingly, the perceptions
about judicial independence of highly educated citizens are much more
aligned with those of judges and lawyers than citizens with low educa-
tion.10 This may be due to differential exposure to accurate information
and/or differing abilities to filter information accurately, but also to a
better working of the judicial system for highly educated people. With
regard to information persons with low education may be exposed to
other media than persons with high education. The differential effect of
sensationalist and serious media has been shown for the US (Johnston
and Bartels 2010).
A consequence is that citizens with low education in countries that
are quite distinct in the eyes of all other groups, may perceive the inde-
pendence of their respective judiciaries similarly (see Fig. 3.2). This is
the case for instance for Latvia and the UK, Romania and Sweden, and
Greece and the Netherlands. This could explain why populist parties that
draw support from among these groups often rally against judiciaries (see
Chapter 7) and find internationally common ground. It is a concern that
judiciaries lack connection with these segments of society.
Apart from education, the survey gives some other characteristics of
the respondents (EC 2019b). The impact of these is smaller than of
9For Hungary the scores are respectively 4.8 and 5.1, for Slovakia 3.7 and 3.9 and for
Greece 5.5 and 5.7.
10Across 17 countries correlation coefficients are 0.69** between perceptions by judges
(all) and perceptions by citizens with high education, and 0.35 between perceptions of
judges and perceptions by citizens with low education. The same correlation coefficients
but with regard to the perceptions by lawyers are: 0.83** and 0.38.
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education. As to age, young people are more positive about judicial inde-
pendence than old people on average across countries. This holds for
countries in Eastern Europe, but not for Western European countries.
Geographical categories (rural villages, small/mid-size towns and large
towns) do not show substantial differences. This is interesting, as populist
support is often suggested to be higher outside the big cities.
The outcomes for citizens in Europe can be compared with the results
for similar surveys in the US, where citizens (registered voters) are
surveyed regularly about the functioning of the state courts. The sample
is relatively small: 1,000. The questions do not address independence
directly, but some questions are connected. In the survey that was held in
November 2019, 54% of the respondents see the state courts as fair and
impartial, 49% as unbiased in their case decisions, but 55% see state courts
as political. This compares broadly with the Eurobarometer survey: 56%
of the respondents perceive independence to be very good or fairly good
for the EU28 (EC 2019b, Table Q1).
Can we get deeper into the opinions of the public? A comparison is
possible with a one-off Eurobarometer survey commissioned by the Euro-
pean Commission about the rule of law: it focuses on the importance
citizens attach to a range of aspects of the rule of law and the need for
improvement of these aspects according to them (EU 2019c). Several
aspects that the survey examines concern the existential notion of effec-
tive judicial protection by independent courts. In this context particularly
relevant are the following aspects with the statements put to respondents
in brackets: access to an independent court (“if individuals’ rights are not
respected, they can have them upheld by an independent court)”, the
independence of judges (“judges are independent and are not under the
influence of politicians or economic interests”), respect for and applica-
tion of court rulings (“public authorities and politicians respect and apply
court rulings”) and criticism on judges (“codes of conduct for politicians
imposing limits on politicians criticizing courts and judges”). On all these
four aspects around 50% of the respondents on average across countries
see a definite need for improvement and another 30% answers “maybe
somewhat”. While the aspects just mentioned are very interesting, the
answers are unfortunately not informative as they are extremely corre-
lated (correlation coefficients 0.98 or 0.99 at country level). Also, the
correlation is very high with the percentage of respondents that recog-
nize a definite need to improve timeliness and costs of court procedures
(0.85 and 0.86). The correlation with the above discussed perceptions of
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the public about independence is −0.74 (correlation between the inde-
pendence score and the need for improvement of independence). The
outcomes of both surveys are consistent in that respect. Apparently, the
public has a rough idea of the independence of the courts, but does not
distinguish between the aspects put to it. For the public, the aspects
mentioned go hand in hand, and no specific aspects jump out. Conse-
quently, it cannot be expected from the general public that it has an
opinion about the deeper aspects of independence.
3.5 Independence as Perceived by Companies
A Eurobarometer survey is available about the perceptions of indepen-
dence by companies (EC 2019a). This survey has the same design as the
survey among the general public. The outcomes of the two surveys are
highly correlated and the mean scores are very close to each other. For
the 22 countries sample the mean is 5.6 with a range of 2.5 for Croatia to
8.6 for Denmark. Table 3.2 gives again the outcomes for the two subsets.
For the two subsets the means are nearly the same for the public and for
firms, and the correlation coefficients are very high.
The statistics hide underlying differences. There are very large “do not
know” categories for some countries. Hungary (53%), Estonia (48%),
Slovenia (30%), Lithuania (27%), Portugal (27%), Sweden (24%), and
Poland (22%) have percentages above 20%. These percentages are much
higher than those for citizens, for instance in Hungary (citizens 24%)
and in Estonia (citizens 30%). This uncertainty could be caused by unfa-
miliarity of companies with the courts, but this is highly unlikely, given
the prevalence of legal disputes in economic life that require court inter-
vention (see the next section). If it may be assumed that firms are
knowledgeable about the courts, the likely cause would be the political
climate in the countries concerned, affecting the current and future inde-
pendence of the courts in general or with respect to business litigation
in particular. This uncertainty is likely to have negative effects on the
behaviour of the companies for instance with regard to investment.
The size of companies seems to play a role (EC 2019a, p. 11). The
survey is in this respect not more than indicative, as the number of partic-
ipating large companies is small. The larger the company, the higher it’s
perception of judicial independence. On average across countries, the
independence score of the smallest companies (1–9 employees) is 5.6, and
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that of the largest (more than 250 employees) 7.0.11 Differences between
countries are erratic probably due to the small number of observations.
3.6 Independence as Perceived
by the Users of the Court
In this section the focus is on the parties in procedures. To elicit the opin-
ions of these court users, two methods can be used. The first method
makes use of a survey among the general population and filters out the
respondents that have been to court. This method is used in the US, for
instance, for the state courts (GBAO 2020). The Eurobarometer survey
about independence among the public has not been designed with this
purpose in mind, but distinguishes between citizens with and without
experience with the courts by asking whether they have been involved
in any dispute which went to court in the last two years (EC 2019b).12
Only a small percentage of the public has that experience: across countries
the mean is 6.2% with a range between 2% in Finland and Sweden and
8% in Portugal and Slovakia with Croatia as outlier with 12%. The abso-
lute numbers per country are low: between 16 and 124 respondents with
a median of 59. Still, it gives an impression. When comparing respon-
dents with and without experience, results must be used with caution,
as selection effects may occur. From a methodological point of view, the
low number of respondents with recent experience can be resolved by
oversampling (see e.g. World Bank 2018). The survey about companies
contains the same question about experience as the survey among citi-
zens.13 The percentage of companies that have experience is 10.5% in the
mean, with 3% in the UK and Sweden and 19% in Germany and Belgium
with Croatia again as outlier with 28%. Absolute numbers of respondents
with experience are low: between 6 and 75 with a median of 22.
The other approach to elicit the views of court users is a court user
survey. In Europe only a small number of judiciaries are systematically
conducting court user surveys, and of those only two include questions
11All across countries means of the perceptions by companies and by judges (all) and
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about independence or related concepts such as impartiality (the Nether-
lands) and neutrality (Denmark). Such a survey is a major investment
for courts, as the survey cannot be implemented by the Internet without
selection effects. CEPEJ is promoting the use of court user surveys and
has had success (CEPEJ 2018). These surveys, however, concern indi-
vidual courts. To get an indication of the perceptions of court users at
present, the Eurobarometer surveys have to be relied on, and the results
can only be contrasted with the scant figures from court user surveys.
The question is whether experience has an impact on perceived inde-
pendence. Effects of experience are likely, as the infrequent contacts
of citizens, in particular, with the courts does not easily allow for the
development of accurate expectations among the whole population. Also,
personal experiences are likely to be varied due to the variety of court cases
and their outcomes. Many factors play a role. In the first place, hands-on
experience would lead to a better understanding of the workings of the
courts and the behaviour of judges. This would lead to respondents being
more opinionated than respondents without experience. Assuming largely
uniform behaviour of judges within a judiciary, one would also expect
more homogeneous replies: in the extreme, 100% would fall in one of
the four categories of positive and negative answers that these surveys use,
instead of a ‘do not know’ category. In the second place, a factor is the
experience of going to court as such. For the US state courts it has been
found that parties have lower confidence in the courts than people that
do not have experience with the courts (Benesh 2006). Benesh argues
that going to court is not a positive experience for parties. For them the
stakes are high, but they have relinquished control over their situation.
This is consistent with her finding that citizens that act as jurors and who
have consequently low stakes and high control have more confidence. If
such negative experience affects perceptions of independence also nega-
tively, this would lead to parties rating the independence of the court
lower than citizens with no experience. A similar finding was made by
Wenzel et al. (2003) that suggests that the adversarial nature of the US
legal system leaves scars.
In the third place, as discussed in Chapter 2, winning or losing one’s
case plays a role in the satisfaction of court users with the court, and this
may have an impact on their perception of the independence of the court,
whether or not justified. If winning or losing is dominant in the minds of
the parties to such an extent that it determines their perceptions of inde-
pendence, perceptions would be sharply divided. In the extreme, 50% of
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the parties is positive about independence and 50% negative, when court
cases end in a winner and loser. This is, luckily, unrealistic. As discussed,
procedural justice plays an important role, and reduces the relevance of
winning and losing. Conversely, lack of procedural justice leads to more
emphasis on winning and losing. Given varying degrees of procedural
justice among judiciaries, this would result in differences in perceived
independence among judiciaries.
Turning to the results of the surveys, Table 3.3 gives the summary
statistics, while Fig. 3.3 presents the overall results in terms of the five
answer categories of the survey, and the results for two judiciaries that
display typical patterns. There are large differences between citizens and
companies. What they have in common, is that experience leads to a
reduction of respondents that have no opinion about judicial indepen-
dence. With regard to citizens the category ‘do not know’ declines from
13 to 5%. See Fig. 3.3. For companies it declines from 16 to 5%.
As to the differences, the independence score awarded by citizens with
experience is significantly lower than that of inexperienced citizens (5.0
vs 5.5 for 17 countries). See Table 3.3. This is the case for nearly all
countries. Exceptions are few: Finland, Portugal, Slovakia and Romania.
A lower score of more than 1 point is found for Germany, Ireland and
the Netherlands.
The independence score of companies differs not significantly for firms
with experience and without experience. The means, however, disguise
big differences among judiciaries. There are countries with positive and
with negative differences. Large positive differences due to experience are
found for the UK, Czech Republic (more than 2 points), Austria, the
Netherlands, Slovenia (between 1 and 2 points). Large negative differ-
ences are found for Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (more than
2 points). Thus, experience has a differential effect.
Table 3.3 shows also that perceptions of citizens with experience are
less highly correlated with the perceptions of judges and lawyers than
perceptions of citizens with no experience. This would be in line with the
individualized experience of court users in which winning or losing plays
a role. This effect is not observed for companies that seem to be more
rational.
Perceptions tend to get more extreme. See Fig. 3.3. There is a
tendency towards the extremes (very good; very bad) with experience
in countries, where this is possible (in Denmark this is, for instance, not
the case, as the upward effect of winning is truncated by the ceiling),
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22 countries public companies
score no experience 5.5 5.6
score experience 5.1 5.7
% experience 6.1% 10.5%
# with experience 1,342 546
% extreme no exp 22% 24%
% extreme exp 33% 32%
% homogeneous no exp 36% 40%
% homogeneous exp 30% 48%
Italy public companies
score no experience 4.5 3.9
score experience 3.9 4.3
% experience 5.9% 5.7%
# with experience 59 22
% extreme no exp 19% 26%
% extreme exp 44% 34%
% homogeneous no exp 8% 21%
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very good fairly good don't know fairly bad very bad
Italy: companies
no experience experience
Fig. 3.3 Score of judicial independence by the public and by companies,
without and with experience with disputes in court, average for 22 countries
and average scores for Italy and for Czechia (Notes [1] Experience: involvement
in any dispute which went to court in the last two years; [2] Extreme: sum of
answer categories ‘very good’ and ‘very bad’, for respondents with and without
experience; [3] Homogeneous: absolute value of ‘(very) good’ minus ‘(very)
bad’, for respondents with and without experience)
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Czechia public companies
score no experience 5.2 4.7
score experience 5.7 7.2
% experience 7.6% 15.7%
# with experience 76 31
% extreme no exp 12% 13%
% extreme exp 36% 46%
% homogeneous no exp 14% 1%


































that can be attributed to the impact of winning and losing cases. “Very
good” increases from 10 to 13% of citizens and from 12 to 18% of compa-
nies. “Very bad” increases from 11 to 20% for citizens and 12 to 14% of
companies. In 14 out of 22 countries very good is higher for citizens
with experience, and in 20 countries very bad is higher. Winning and
losing seems to play a role for citizens in most countries. The impact on
the perceptions of companies is more differentiated among countries.
The perceptions of citizens are less homogeneous for experienced than
for inexperienced citizens, when measured as the percentages of very good
and fairly good minus very bad and fairly bad. The absolute value of these
differences across countries gives an indication whether respondents agree
that the judiciary is independent or not independent. For citizens this
percentage is lower for experience than for no experience (28 vs 35%).
For companies, it is the other way round (48 vs 40%).
While the data allow only tentative conclusions, the main finding is
that winning and losing has the most consistent effect, together with the
reduction of uncertainty as such.
As mentioned before, the use of court user surveys that include ques-
tions concerning the independence or impartiality of judges is very limited
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in the countries examined here. This is telling about the mentality of the
courts. Denmark and the Netherlands are conducting such surveys on
a regular basis, the last one was in Denmark in 2013 (Oxford Research
2013) and in the Netherlands in 2017 (SAMR 2017). In Denmark the
item of the survey that touches on independence is neutrality of the judge,
and in the Netherlands impartiality of the judge. The survey method is
totally different from the Eurobarometer, as the survey is administered
in the courts. In Denmark 84% of the respondents replied that judges
are neutral, 10% was indifferent or did not know and 6% answered that
judges are not neutral. These outcomes compare with the results of the
Eurobarometer for respondents with experience: 77%, 7% and 16% (n =
36), and without experience: 88%, 7% and 5% (n = 966).
For the Netherlands, in the court user survey 79% of the respondents
answered that the judge was impartial, 16% was neutral or did not know
and 5% responded that the judge was not impartial. The Eurobarometer
collected much more critical responses: with experience 60%, 8%, and 32%
(n = 70), and without experience 73%, 14% and 13% (n = 927). While
differences are to be expected in view of the different questions and the
different methodology, the outcomes are roughly consistent for Denmark
but not for the Netherlands. More court user surveys are needed to enable
a comparison of the two research methods. In addition court user surveys
offer the possibility to differentiate the court users with respect to social
and cultural background. Given the inequalities in society, this differ-
entiation is particularly important (see e.g. Wenzel et al. 2003 on the
US).
3.7 Explanations
of the Differences of Perceptions
The main conclusion is that the perceptions among categories of actors,
with the exception of the general public with low education, are highly
correlated. At the same time perceptions differ substantially in level with
judges generally being more positive about their independence than
lawyers, and lawyers being more positive than the public in general, and
in particular citizens with low education, as well as companies, and in
particular small companies.
The impact of education is unexpected: the difference of the indepen-
dence scores of citizens with high education and the scores of citizens
with low education is positive and large in countries with a high level
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of independence according to judges and lawyers. When independence
is perceived to be low, the differences disappear, and in some countries
are even reversed. Citizens with low education are more positive about
independence than citizens with high education.
As to the parties in law suits, the availability of data is an impediment.
Also, the interaction of gaining more insight by personal experience in the
independence of judges and the potential impact of winning and losing
cases complicates the analysis. The data clearly indicate that people with
experience are more opinionated about independence (much less ‘do not
know’ answers are given), and also that opinions of persons with expe-
rience are more extreme than the opinions of those without experience,
suggesting that winning and losing play a role. It was also found that
the main score of independence for citizens with experience is lower than
that for citizens without experience. This leads to an even larger distance
to the perceptions of judges than the inexperienced public has. It must
be noted that selection effects (for instance for citizens with respect to
education and for companies firm size) may play a role, but this cannot
be checked because of the data limitations.
What could explain the lack of alignment of judges and society? Two
extreme explanations will be considered in the next chapters.
(1) Judges live in the often suggested ivory tower:
• Judges evaluate their independence too positively, consciously
or unconsciously. They have a strong esprit de corps, are not
open for criticism, and in denial about the workings of the
legal system. They are focussed on their case work, and do
not pay attention to the big picture.
• Lawyers are more critical than judges, but they are part of the
judicial/legal system, benefit from it, and are therefore more
positive than external observers would be.
• The perceptions of the court users and the general public may
be biased, but, just because they are outsiders, their percep-
tions are more reliable and informative than those of judges
and lawyers.
(2) The general public is not well informed about the courts, and
biased negatively due to influence of media, social media and in
some countries politics:
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• Judges are accurate about judicial independence in general in
their country, and their perceptions are reliable and informa-
tive.
• The perceptions of lawyers are affected by winning and,
in particular, losing cases. Also, they are dependent on the
judges, and lack control over the proceedings which as such
is frustrating.
• Parties are affected by winning and losing, as was shown
above, and more intensely so than lawyers. They also lack
control to a larger degree than the lawyers, and they cannot
recognize when justice is done.
• The general public is subject to (social) media influence.
The media report selectively with an emphasis on sensational
events and matters that have gone wrong. Negative events
have a stronger and more lasting impact than positive events
(Baumeister et al. 2001).
• Distrust of public institutions in general affects the perception
of judicial independence by the public.
The next Chapter examines how citizens who take part in the judiciary as
lay judges view the independence of the judiciary. In as far as lay judges
are critical observers of the judicial system, their perceptions about judi-
cial independence could be decisive in determining which of these two
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CHAPTER 4
Perceptions of Lay Judges About
Independence of the Judiciary
Abstract Lay judges are citizens with particular knowledge of and expe-
rience with the judiciary. The findings of a survey among the lay judges
of ten judiciaries are examined in this chapter. It is found that the percep-
tions of lay judges of judicial independence, their own as well as that
of the professional judges, are very similar to the perceptions of the
professional judges. In addition, lay judges are most positive about their
independence, when they participate in judicial panels together with
professional judges and when they are taken seriously by the profes-
sional judges. For them, these conditions surpass sitting alone as a judge.
Although selection effects may play a role, the results indicate that expe-
rience as a lay judge leads to a much higher appreciation of judicial
independence than that of (highly educated) citizens in general. This in
turn indicates that the views of the general public are too negative about
judicial independence.
Keywords Lay judges · Judicial independence · Survey
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4.1 Lay Judges and Judicial Independence
Lay judges are a potentially interesting group when one wants to know
more about perceptions of the independence of the judiciary. First of all
because they are judges in their own right, and therefore their own inde-
pendence matters. In the second place, they have hands on experience
in the judiciary, yet they have less vested interests in the judiciary than
professional judges as their primary tasks lay outside the courts. They do
not fall under the court hierarchy for their careers like judges (Schneider
2005). Also, they do not have an interest in the cases they adjudicate
like the parties and their lawyers. Lay judges are in a position to be more
objective about the judiciary than the professional judges as well as the
parties and lawyers. Their perceptions of the independence of the whole
system are particularly interesting when they fulfil their tasks together with
professional judges. This they generally do.
The number of lay judges amounts to 250,000 in the EU, the UK and
Norway.1 The latter two countries are included because they participated
in the survey discussed below. This number can be compared with 83,500
professional judges. It should be stressed that these figures concern the
number of persons. In full time equivalents the number of lay judges is
only a small but unknown fraction of this figure. The involvement of lay
judges is very unevenly spread across countries. In 68% of the above judi-
ciaries lay judges play a role. In the judiciaries that make use of lay judges,
their numbers per 100,000 inhabitants range from 6 in Italy and 8 in
Scotland through 37 in France and 112 in Germany to 174 in Denmark
and a staggering 856 in Norway (CEPEJ 2018). According to CEPEJ lay
judges are working in all areas of law, and in some countries this is actu-
ally the case (Denmark, Norway and, except family cases, Belgium). In
other countries the participation is much more limited, such as in Scot-
land where only misdemeanour and minor criminal cases are handled by
lay judges. Involvement in serious criminal cases occurs often: in 75% of
the countries that have lay judges. Also, in specific areas of civil law such
as labour law there is relatively often involvement of lay judges. Machura
(2016) looks at the involvement of lay judges in civil proceedings. He
concludes that a wide variety exists in the way lay judges are involved. See
1CEPEJ (2018, Table 3.6, p. 109). Data on lay judges for Greece were provided by
the Supreme Judicial Council of Greece. Same sources for the other data on numbers of
(lay) judges.
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also Burgess et al. (2014) on lay person involvement in specialized labour
courts that exist in some countries. Again, differences among countries
are large.
The reach of the survey among lay judges of the ENCJ (see Table 3.1)
is much smaller than that of the survey among professional judges,
because, obviously, not all judiciaries deploy lay judges but also for admin-
istrative reasons such as difficulties in reaching lay judges. Ten Judiciaries
participated in the survey. Scandinavia had a heavy presence in the survey,
but all parts of Europe are represented. As background information, the
survey shows how lay judges are deployed. Consistent with the discus-
sion above, the dominant form of lay participation is lay judges taking
part in mixed panels with professional judges adjudicating criminal cases,
but a variety of settings occurs. See Table 4.1. Only in the UK and Italy
lay judges sit without professional judges as dominant form. Some lay
judges (approximately 6%) operate in several settings. On average across
countries, 71% of all settings in which lay judges operate involves inter-
action with professional judges. In Italy and in the UK this percentage is
Table 4.1 Setting in which lay judges adjudicate cases: number of answers given























Belgium 805 918 12.6 2,0 4.9 80.5
Denmark 5,983 6,206 0.1 5.3 2.2 92.4
Greece 363 366 1.4 14.2 1.4 83.1
Italy 485 549 68.5 1.5 15.8 14.2
Norway 7,942 8,256 0.6 10.2 3.5 85.7
Poland 763 770 1.2 1.4 3.5 93.9
Slovenia 429 431 1.4 4.6 2.8 91.2
Sweden 2,611 2,733 0.3 2.7 2.6 94.4
UK: E&W 1,106 1,415 10.8 47.6 4.5 37.1




20,605 21,766 14.5 9.3 4.8 71.4
Note Lay judges sometimes operate in several settings, and more than one answer is possible
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much lower: 30% in Italy, 42% in England and Wales and 48% in Scot-
land. Still, in all countries many lay judges have direct experience with
the way professional judges behave which is necessary for the purpose of
evaluating the independence of the judiciary as a whole.
In the remainder of this Chapter the following topics will be discussed.
• The perceptions of lay judges of their own independence and of the
independence of the professional judges. Perceptions are compared
with those of the general public.
• Aspects of independence and the connection of these aspects with
the overall perception of independence. The analysis focuses on the
interaction of lay judges and professional judges in mixed panels.
This interaction is informative about the attitudes of professional
judges that in turn affect the independence of lay judges and their
perceptions about the independence of professional judges.
• Comparison of the perceptions of lay judges with the perceptions of
professional judges.
Table 4.2 provides the summary data. Like the professional judges, the lay
judges in the judiciaries that took part in the survey are generally positive
about their independence. The survey asked lay judges to rate their own
independence as well as the independence of all the lay judges in their
country.2 The mean score on own independence over the 10 judiciaries
was 9.0 on the 11-points scale from 0 to 10 (average across countries).
59% of the respondents gave their independence the maximum score of
10 and 21% a score of 9. Only 4% gave a score lower than 6. Inde-
pendence of the lay judges in general is less personal as well as broader,
as respondents may take aspects such as the selection of lay judges into
account. The mean score was lower, 8.5 with 37% of the respondents
awarding a score of 10 and 26% of 9.5% gave a score lower than 6. Exam-
ining the outcomes per country, the mean scores on own independence
range from 8.7 in Italy to 9.4 in Scotland and on the independence of
all lay judges from 7.5 in Italy to 9.3 in Scotland. The outcomes are very
similar to the outcomes of the survey among professional judges for these
countries.
2Literally: “On a scale of 0-10 (where 0 means “not independent at all” and 10 means
“highest possible degree of independence”) as a judge I am”. Same, but: “the lay judges
in my country are”.
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics of the perceptions of judicial independence of
lay judges by lay judges (personally and all lay judges) and professional judges
by lay judges, the perceptions of independence of professional judges (personal
and general) by professional judges and the perceptions of independence by the



















Mean 9.0 8.5 8.5 9.1 8.7 5.9 6.2
Min–Max 8.7−9.4 7.5−9.3 7.4−9.3 8.4−9.8 7.6−9.8 4.3−8.0 4.1−8.2
SD 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.6
Typical patterns
Greece 8.9 8.1 7.4 8.9 8.0 5.6 5.5
Italy 8.7 7.5 7.8 9.3 8.4 4.4 4.8





1 0.89** 0.84** 0.69* 0.76* 0.90** 0.94**
Lay
judges all




















1. BE, DK, EL, IT, NO, PL, SL, SW, UK EW, and UK SC
2. Correlation across countries. Significance: **0.01 and *0.05. See list of country abbreviations at
the end of Chapter 3
3. Poland: scores for professional judges based on ENCJ survey 2017
4. N = 10 for all except general public; N = 9 for general public (no data for Norway)
5. Paired sample T -test of means on country level: the means do not differ (at 5% significance level)
of: (1) lay judges all and lay judges on professional judges, (2) Lay judges own and professional judges
own, lay judges all and professional judges all, and lay judges on professional judges and professional
judges all
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The lay judges were also asked to rate the independence of the profes-
sional judges in their country. The scores are nearly the same as those
for the lay judges themselves: the mean score was 8.5 with 39% of the
respondents awarding a score of 10 and 25% of 9.6% gave a score lower
than 6. Examining the outcomes per country, the means range from 7.4
in Greece and Poland to 9.3 in Denmark. Across country correlations are
high between all measures, except the personal independence scores of
the professional judges, which we saw earlier as well. The first conclusion
is that lay judges and professional judges have very similar views on actual
independence. This extreme similarity is surprising.
The last two columns of Table 4.2 give the perceptions of the general
public, overall and with a high level of education. While correlations are
high, the large difference in level with the professional judges is repeated
here for the lay judges. The second conclusion is, therefore, that lay
judges are in the mean much more positive about the independence of
the judiciary than the public in general, whether it concerns their personal
independence, the independence of all lay judges or that of the profes-
sional judges. It might be assumed that lay judges are generally recruited
from citizens with a higher education. The last column of Table 4.2 gives
the outcomes for the part of the general public that has a high education.
The impact of education is small for the countries that participated in the
surveys. High education reduces the differences only a little, but increases
the correlations, as would be expected.
These findings suggest that direct observation and participation in the
adjudication of cases lead to higher appreciation of the work of judges.
This presupposes that the opinions that the persons held before they
became lay judges were similar to those of the (highly educated) general
public. Alternative or complementary explanations cannot be ruled out.
Cultural adaptation to the dominant professional judges, combined with
lack of understanding what really goes on during trials, cannot be
excluded as cause for positive perceptions. These findings show, however,
similarity with the outcomes of research into the perceptions of citizens
about the evaluation of evidence and the severity of sentences in criminal
cases in the Netherlands: once citizens had to decide on sentences them-
selves with knowledge of the facts of the case, the initial view that actual
sentences were too lenient disappeared, and the opinions of judges and
citizens converged (Wagenaar 2008). In both situations the opinions of
judges and citizens converge, while in the latter citizens and judges did
not interact. Members of the public are apparently so unfamiliar with the
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judiciary that a large shift in opinions is possible, once the knowledge gap
has been filled.
4.2 Interaction of Lay Judges
and Professional Judges
The independence of lay judges is not entirely the same as that of profes-
sional judges. Lay judges have to relate with the professional judges, in
particular when they participate in mixed teams, and they may heavily
depend on them. An analysis of the independence of lay judges, there-
fore, needs to consider the interaction of lay and professional judges in
mixed panels, as the dominant form of interaction.
An important issue in the literature about lay judges is whether lay
judges have influence on decisions, when participating in mixed panels.
Casper and Zeisel concluded in 1972 in an impressive, in depth study
that “the traceable overall effect of the lay judges on the verdicts of
the German criminal courts is indeed small” (Casper and Zeisel 1972,
p. 189). The study finds that lay judges affect the verdict in only 1.4% of
all cases. It notes that it is not known “whether lay judges feel encour-
aged or restrained in the performance of their duty by the professional
judges that sit with them” (Casper and Zeisel 1972, p. 189). A similar
view about the limited impact of lay judges in mixed teams is expressed
for Sweden in Diesen (2001). The same conclusion is reached in Kutnjak
Ivkovic (2003, 2007) about the impact of lay judges on the (quality of)
decisions and their active participation in deliberations, but there other
beneficial, social aspects are stressed, leading to a positive evaluation of
mixed panels. Voigt (2009, p. 327) finds that “the effects of lay participa-
tion on the judicial system, a number of governance variables but also on
economic performance indicators are rather modest.” These findings raise
the question whether the professional judges bolster the independence of
lay judges or detract from their independence.
The survey among the lay judges allows an answer to this question
from the perspective of the lay judges themselves. Using the survey data,
an analysis of the factors that affect their perception of independence can
be made. Table 4.3 presents the results of a regression analysis at the indi-
vidual level. The dependent variable is the perceived independence of lay
judges in general, and the independent variables are personal character-
istics, perceived external and internal pressure and the interaction with
professional judges. All variables prove to play a significant role. Here, it
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Table 4.3 Determinants of perceived independence of lay judges, linear
regression
Perceived independence of lay
judges
Variable Variant 1 Variant 2 Variation
Inappropriate pressure 0.46*** 0.30*** 0.21
Accepted bribes 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.10
Affected by a threat or an actual disciplinary or
other action
0.24*** 0.21*** 0.09
Decisions affected by actions of the media 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.11
Decisions affected by actions using social media 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.12
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) −0.12*** 0.06
Age (years) 0.01*** 0.13
Number of cases 0.02 0.03
Resolved cases alone 0.04 0.01
Resolved cases together with professional judges 0.14*** 0.04
Inappropriate influence of professionals in mixed
panel
0.16*** 0.15
Contribution taken seriously by professionals in
mixed panel
0.29*** 0.24
Had impact on decision in mixed panel 0.17*** 0.16




1. Significance levels: *0.05, **0.01 and ***0.01
2. All variables, accept for individual characteristics, concern lay judges in general. For all variables
higher, is better
3. Two variants: variant 1 includes only aspects of independence that are relevant for lay judges as
well as professional judges; variant 2 is the full model
4. Last column gives an indication of the variation in perceived independence that can be attributed
to the related variable in variant 2. In this measure the absolute effect (given in the former column)
and the standard deviation of the variable in the survey are combined
is of particular interest that the survey not only includes questions about
the setting in which lay judges adjudicate cases, but also contains ques-
tions about the quality of the interaction when they sit together with
professional judges. While one would expect that lay judges feel most
independent when they sit alone, the outcomes show otherwise. Lay
judges feel most independent when they sit with professional judges and
they are respected by these professional judges in the sense that (1) they
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experience no inappropriate influence of these judges, (2) their contri-
butions are taken seriously by them and (3) they have an impact on
decisions. These conditions are according to the survey generally met:
on average across countries, respectively, 84, 88 and 75% of the respon-
dents (strongly) agree with the statements about these three aspects. As a
result, lay judges operating in mixed panels perceive on average the inde-
pendence of lay judges in their country approximately 0.14 points higher
than their colleagues sitting with only other lay judges and approx. 0.10
points higher than lay judges sitting alone. However, if lay judges score
neutral or negative on all three of the items about the functioning of
mixed panels, their perception of the independence of lay judges in the
country is at least 0.75 points lower than that of their colleagues not
sitting in mixed panels. Practically, this is not relevant, as only 1% of the
responding lay judges in mixed panels are neutral or negative about all
three aspects.
To conclude, most lay judges interact with professional judges in mixed
teams, they experience this generally as positive, and they derive from
this a positive perception about their independence. These outcomes are
very different from the conclusions of the literature that we discussed.
The difference may be caused by the countries that participated. For
instance, Germany, the country studied by Casper and Zeisel (1972),
did not participate in the survey. Apart from timeframe, the big differ-
ence is, however, the methodology, as here the survey among lay judges
provides the data, while the study of Casper and Zeisel (1972) is based
on a relatively small survey among professional judges. As the perceptions
of lay judges themselves are the subject of this Chapter, the differences in
outcome do not detract from the relevance of the survey in this context,
but point to the need for more research in this rather neglected area.
4.3 What Do Lay Judges Think
About Professional Judges?
As Table 4.2 shows, in the mean across countries there is no difference
between the views of professional judges and lay judges about the inde-
pendence of professional judges. At the national level, the means of judges
and lay judges differ significantly when evaluated at the individual level.3
3T-test at individual level. Significance level: 0.1%, except Belgium 1% and Poland 5%.
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Combining the data for England and Wales and Scotland, in 6 out of 9
countries lay judges are less positive about the independence of profes-
sional judges than the professional judges themselves. For instance, in
Italy lay judges are more critical (7.8 vs 8.4) as well as in Greece (7.4
vs 8.0). The opposite occurs in three countries (Belgium, Slovenia and
Sweden). For Slovenia the difference is substantial (7.6 vs 8.2). Even
in countries where lay judges are more critical than professional judges
about the independence of professional judges, their assessment is much
closer to that of the professional judges than to that of the general public,
educated or not. Also, in the view of the lay judges, the interaction
between lay and professional judges is in general positive. It seems safe to
conclude that there is no disconnect between judges and lay judges in the
countries for which data are available. Although alternative explanations
such as dominance of the professional judges who set the standards of
behaviour that are uncritically followed by the lay judges cannot be ruled
out, the gap between judges and citizens disappears, once citizens expe-
rience hands-on how judges work, and do the work themselves. If this is
so, the general public is not well informed about the judiciary, and their
perceptions of judicial independence are distorted. At the same time, lay
judges are not able to bring the perception of the general public about
independence in line with their own perceptions to the extent that the
gap is closed between their perceptions and those of the general public.
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CHAPTER 5
Respect for Judicial Independence
Abstract This Chapter examines whether judges feel that their indepen-
dence is respected. Three categories of actors are distinguished: the court
users, the political system and the internal decision makers of the judiciary.
Judges feel in the mean most respected by the internal leadership, to a
lesser extent by the court users and least by the political system. In some
countries judges do not feel respected by the political system at all. In the
opinion of the judges, respect by the different actors has different features.
Perceived respect shown by litigants has to do with absence of bribery
and other forms of corruption, and inappropriate pressure. Respect by
government and parliament is about the implementation of judgments
by government and the case load of the judiciary. Case load depends on
the resources that politicians make available. Respect by court manage-
ment concerns absence of pressure on judges to adjudicate cases timely,
case load and promotion of judges based on merit. Caseload is a recur-
ring determinant of perceived respect for independence. This suggests
that independence is highly affected by resource allocation.
Keywords Respect for independence · Survey · Politicians · Court
users · Leadership
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5.1 Respect for Independence
by Categories of Actors
The survey among judges provides insight into the extent to which judges
feel that their independence is respected by a range of actors.1 Their
perceptions may of course differ from the respect these actors them-
selves believe to have or express for the independence of the judiciary.
Judges observe the behaviour of these actors in court and, for instance, at
the macro level in budget allocations to the judiciary, and therefore can
provide insight in the respect shown in behaviour instead of only in words.
Obviously, judges may have distorted observations or incentives to distort
their observations in a survey to influence outcomes. Also, opinions of
actors may differ about what respect or due regard for judicial indepen-
dence actually is. Still, the opinions of those at work in the courts are
particularly relevant to understand what the judiciary needs to function
independently. As discussed in Chapter 2, respect for judicial indepen-
dence throws light on the legitimacy of the judiciary. This approach also
allows differentiation and comparison between categories of actors. In the
next Chapter the perspective of the general public is considered.
For the professional judges the actors that they deal with fall in three
categories: (1) the court users: parties, their lawyers and, in criminal cases,
prosecutors, (2) the political system: government, parliament and the
(social) media, and (3) the leadership of the judiciary: the highest courts
(Supreme court, Constitutional Court) and the governance institutions
of the judiciary (court management including the president of the court,
councils for the judiciary, associations of judges). These are very different
categories: the behaviour of participants in judicial procedures is relevant
for day to day court cases. Judges interact directly and intensively with
them. While there is good reason to show deference to the judges in
court given their position of power, this does not preclude participants
to try to influence judges inappropriately, such as by bribery in any form,
threats, attempts to get judges off cases and attempts to influence case
allocation.
The political system that consists of parliament and government in
conjunction with the traditional media and to a lesser extent the social
1Statement in survey (ENCJ 2019): “In the last two years, I believe that my inde-
pendence as a judge has been respected by [actor]”. Five answer categories offered as to
(dis)agreement with the statement.
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media operates at the systemic level of legislation and resource allocation.
Government and, to a lesser extent, parliament are also often involved
in some way in the appointment of members of the highest courts and
the governance institutions like councils for the judiciary,2 but they can
also attempt to intervene in individual court cases. And government itself
is involved in court procedures. In these cases it is particularly relevant
whether government abides by the judgments, also when these judg-
ments go against the interest of government. In addition, politicians can
express opinions about the judiciary, and influence public opinion. These
roles can be played in different ways: by honouring the division of the
powers of the state, providing sufficient resources, showing restraint as to
influence on appointments and, if involved, by supporting appointments
on merit, implementing judicial decisions, not criticizing the judiciary
pending court cases and unduly, not doubting the democratic legitimacy
of the judiciary, and so on. Or politicians can pursue the opposite. In pure
form examples of the first approach can be found in Scandinavia and of
the second approach in Poland and Hungary (e.g. Kovács and Scheppele
2018).
In a democracy the media play a crucial role in informing the public
and politics about what goes on in the courts and in court cases. They
can do this in various ways. State controlled media in particular may
exhibit political bias, and influence public opinion in the direction the
government wants. Poland is again a case in point. While not owned or
controlled by the state, media can be politically associated with polit-
ical parties to similar effect. An extreme example was set in the United
Kingdom where justices of the Supreme Court were depicted as enemies
of the people, when the Supreme Court decided against the govern-
ment in a Brexit related case.3 On social media similar phenomena can
be observed. Media differ in their approach. Johnston and Bartels (2010)
distinguishes sensationalist and sober media. It finds that sensationalist
media reduce the support for the American courts on specific issues but
also in general.
2See EC (2020) and ENCJ (2020) for the institutional arrangements in EU countries.
3Front page of the Daily Mail on 4 November 2016 under the heading: “Enemies of
the people, Fury over ‘out of touch’ judges who defied 17.4m Brexit voters and could
trigger constitutional crisis”, and which starts with: “MPS last night tore into an unelected
panel of ‘out of touch’ judges for ruling that embittered Remain supporters in Parliament
should be allowed to frustrate the overwhelming verdict of the British public.”
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The internal independence of judges is determined by the judicial hier-
archy, explicit or implicit, within and between courts but also by court
management, for instance relating to human resource decisions. While
judges may be fully independent in their judgments, career considera-
tions make them dependent on the authorities, such as the president of
the court, that have the power to make these decisions (see Schneider
2005). Whether judges let their behaviour be guided by this dependence,
is another matter. As mentioned before, the ENCJ survey shows that
many judges feel that, in particular, promotion decisions are problematic
from the perspective of judicial independence (ENCJ 2019, p. 34). In
this Chapter respect for independence is discussed in a national context.
The influence of EU institutions will be considered in the next Chapter.
Table 5.1 provides the key statistics. Results are expressed as scores
on a scale of 0–10 as before, for ease of comparison, and are recalcu-
lated from five answer categories. The Table gives correlations within the
three categories of actors. While correlations are moderate to high among
most combinations across categories, the perceived respect for judicial
independence by the actors in the first two categories are very highly
correlated. The third group draws a much more heterogeneous response,
where constitutional courts are much less integrated than, for instance,
supreme courts in the judicial system. Not depicted in the Table, the
perceived respect from supreme courts is highly correlated with that from
parties and lawyers. Also not depicted, prosecutors are not only partici-
pants in trials but also close to the judiciary or part of a joint magistrature.
This explains the perception of high respect from prosecutors for judi-
cial independence. With regard to the actors in the political system, the
across country means of government and parliament as well as the means
of media and social media are indistinguishable. The means for the court
users differ significantly, while the internal actors show varied outcomes
(see note 2 of Table 5.1).
Most judges report that their independence is respected by parties,
lawyers and prosecutors. The score of 7.4 for the parties corresponds with
75% of the judges agreeing with the statement that their independence is
respected, 15% being uncertain and 10% disagreeing. In the eyes of the
judges much less respect is shown by the other state powers and the media
(the score of 6.1 for government corresponds with percentages of, respec-
tively, 54%, 20% and 25%). Judges experience even less respect from the
traditional media. There are not many countries in which the relations are
better with the media than with politics. Only Denmark, the Netherlands
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Table 5.1 Respect for independence as perceived by judges by categories of
actors, for 24 countries of Europe
MeanMin−MaxSDSelected correlations
Actors Parties Lawyers Prosecution
Parties 7.4 6.0−9.5 0.9 1 0.90** 0.88**
Lawyers 7.8 6.0−9.5 1.0 1 0.90**
Prosecution 8.4 6.9−9.6 0.7 1
Parliament Government Media Social
media
Parliament 6.2 3.6−8.9 1.4 1 0.96** 0.93** 0.77**
Government 6.1 3.5−8.7 1.6 1 0.91** 0.74**
Media 5.7 3.8−8.7 1.6 1 0.87**
Social
Media














8.6 7.5−9.6 0.7 1 0.59* 0.71** 0.62** 0.84**
Constitutional
Court
8.3 7.3−9.5 0.9 1 0.06 0.54 0.68**
Court
management
8.2 6.5−9.6 0.7 1 0.54* 0.51**
Council for
judiciary
7.8 6.0−9.4 1.0 1 0.57**
Judges
Association
8.8 7.1−9.8 0.8 1
Notes
1. Country coverage: 24 countries as in Table 3.2, but England and Wales and Scotland instead of
UK and including Norway
2. Paired sample T -test of means on country level: means are not significantly different of: (1)
parliament and government, media and social media, (2) supreme court and constitutional court,
court management and constitutional court, council for judiciary and court management, association
of judges and constitutional court. All other combinations of means differ significantly (<0.05)
and Romania are exceptions. While the social media get the same mean
score as the traditional media, judges are much more uncertain about
their relationship with social media: 35% of the respondents is uncertain,
compared to 22% for the traditional media. Given the diverse and fluid
character of social media, this is understandable.
Internal independence is well respected with generally higher scores
than the scores of the other two categories of actors. The lowest scores
are reserved for Councils for the Judiciary (7.8 with the corresponding
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percentages 77%, 13% and 10%), but their mean score is still at a different
(higher) level than that of government and parliament.
5.2 Content of Respect for Independence
Respect for independence has a distinct content for the three categories
of actors. This can be checked by examining the factors that relate to the
respect variables. The ENCJ survey among judges examines a wide range
of constituent elements of independence, and these elements can be used.
Linear regression is applied at the level of judiciaries. Table 5.2 summa-
rizes the outcomes. Respect by citizens as perceived by judges is related to
corruption (such as bribery) and inappropriate pressure that judges expe-
rience. Respect by government and parliament depends primarily on the
resources made available for the judiciary as reflected in the case load
of judges, and on the implementation of judgments that go against the
interest of government. The latter factor plays a role for the prosecu-
tion as well. This reflects the concerns of the judiciary of not being taken
seriously. A judge can be totally independent in her court room, but if
her judgments are not implemented, her independence is fundamentally
flawed. The respect for independence by the media connects to a state-
ment in the survey about the impact of the media: “decisions or actions
of individual judges have, during the last two years, been directly affected
by the actual, or anticipated, actions of the media (i.e. press, television or
radio)”. There is a strong relationship between respect from the media
and the replies to this statement. The differences between countries are
large: in Portugal only 25% of judges feels respected by the media, and,
consistently, 50% believes judgments and behaviour of judges is affected
by the media. In contrast, in Ireland 71% feels respected and only 4% sees
an impact on behaviour of judges. The exception is England and Wales:
a very low 27% of judges feels their independence respected, but only 6%
sees an impact. The second variable that affects respect of the media is
disciplinary action to influence judicial decisions. Here, causality is not
evident, except that disciplinary measures are newsworthy events and can
get magnified in the press. Respect by court management is related to
the pressure exerted by management on judges to decide cases in a timely
fashion, case load and the promotion of judges. Councils for the judiciary
are apparently also seen as responsible for case load. Supreme Courts are
expected to take a leadership role. These courts are associated with the
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Table 5.2 Determinants of respect for independence by selected actors as
perceived by judges, linear regression
Actors Determinants Stand. B Sign. Adjusted R2


































































Dependent variable: perceived respect of independence by [actor], score
Independent variables: statements of survey, percentage (strongly) agree:
Corruption: In my country I believe that during the last two years individual judges have accepted
bribes or have engaged in other forms of corruption as an inducement to decide case(s) in a specific
way
Inappropriate pressure: During the last two years I have been under inappropriate pressure to take a
decision in a case or part of a case in a specific way
Disciplinary action: During the last two years I have been affected by a threat of, or actual,
disciplinary or other official action because of how I decided a case
Media pressure: I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during
the last two years, been inappropriately affected by the actual, or anticipated, actions of the media
(i.e. press, television or radio)
Case load: I believe that changes which occurred in my working conditions in relation to case load
directly affected my independence
Implementation: In the last two years, I believe judgements that went against the interests of the
government were usually implemented/enforced in my country
Pressure timeliness: During the last two years the management of my court has exerted inappropriate
pressure on me to decide individual cases within a particular time
Promotion: I believe judges in my country have been promoted or appointed other than on the basis
of ability and experience during the last two years
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implementation of judgments and the case load of judges. Also, inappro-
priate pressure is significant, indicating that supreme courts not only play
a beneficial role. All variables have the expected sign.
The results are generally intuitive. What is striking is the large role of
case load in relation to respect for independence. Lack of resources appar-
ently permeates the judicial system, and many actors are held responsible,
although judges clearly understand where the bucket ends: with govern-
ment and parliament. Also, the small role of appointment and promotion
issues is remarkable. Only, a relation exists between promotion of judges
and respect for independence by court management. It seems that judges
focus on their day to day work in court, and less on system wide issues.
5.3 Differences Among Countries
As follows from the descriptive statistics of Table 5.1, large differences
exist among countries, in particular with regard to respect of indepen-
dence by politics and media. Figure 5.1 maps the country scores of
perceived respect for independence by parties to judicial proceedings and
parliament, as representative of, respectively, court users and the political
system. The perceived respect by these two actors is positively correlated
(Table 5.1), and the difference between the two actors decreases with the
increase of one of the scores.
The low scores of Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania reflect that only
around 20% of the judges feel that their independence is respected by
parliament and government. For respect from the media outcomes are
similar. On the other hand, 80–90% of judges feels respected in the Scan-
dinavian countries. England and Wales score surprisingly low with 36%
and 37% of the judges feeling respected, respectively, by parliament and
government, 27% by the traditional media and 17% by the social media.
As to the parties and lawyers, a much higher respect score for both of
them than for politics and media does not imply that the legitimacy of
the judiciary in the eyes of the users of the courts is at an adequate level.
For instance, in Bulgaria and Latvia in the order of 50% of the judges feels
respected by parties and lawyers. Is this sufficient for a judiciary to func-
tion effectively? It must be noted that the percentage of judges that feels
not respected by the parties is relatively low (17% in Bulgaria and 15%
in Latvia). Many judges (in Bulgaria 30% and Latvia 38%) do not know
whether parties respect their independence. It does not seem that these
judiciaries—and other judiciaries as well—are positively legitimized by the




































Fig. 5.1 Respect of independence of the judiciary by parties to judicial proceed-
ings and parliament, average per country (Notes Scores between 0 and 10; See
list of country abbreviations at the end of Chapter 3)
population to fulfil their mission, and thus they have a double problem:
in the political arena and in the court room.
As to the internal actors, judges generally feel respected by the highest
judges and by court management. Most variety, apart from several
constitutional courts having specific issues, is shown by councils for the
judiciary, reflecting different mandates, institutional arrangements but
foremost actual behaviour of councils: percentages vary from around 55%
of judges feeling respected by councils in Romania, Portugal and Spain up
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to 90% in Slovakia, Denmark and the UK.4 The developments in Poland
have made abundantly clear that within a few years a council can play very
different roles, varying from protecting the independence of the judiciary
to endangering independence by extending the influence of the govern-
ment within the judiciary. Court management is generally seen as being
respectful for independence. The lowest scores are found for Portugal
(59% of the judges feels their independence respected) and Latvia (69%).
Only Portugal combines relatively low scores for court management and
council for the judiciary, pointing to serious internal governance issues.
To summarize, the categorization in court users, the political system
and internal actors (highest courts and governance institutions) makes
it possible to analyse the main issues the courts face. The issues about
independence are largest between judiciary and politics, and play out in
resource allocation and implementation of judgments. Respect for inde-
pendence is much higher among the court users. This does not imply,
however, that the respect by the court users is at a high level in all coun-
tries. The legitimacy of the judiciary is in several countries an issue. It
is, however, difficult to draw a line between judiciaries with and without
sufficient legitimacy. In Chapter 7 this is further discussed. The leadership
of the judiciary generally respects judicial independence.
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Abstract The Chapter examines the trust of the general public in the
judiciary at the national and EU-level. The starting point is that the
correlation between the independence of the judiciary as perceived by
the general public and the trust in the judiciary by the same public is
very strong: trust in the judiciary equals trust in the independence of the
judiciary. Trust in the judiciary is generally higher than that in parlia-
ment and government. However, the trust in the judiciary is generally
at the same level as that in the public administration. It is likely that
the general public associates the public administration with desirable, fair
and impartial implementation of public policies, and not so much with
(divisive) policy formation. Thus, it is too simple to conclude that the
judiciary performs better than the other powers of the state. High trust
in the judiciary is fostered by the nature of the tasks. At the EU-level
the differentiation of trust between the three branches of government is
much smaller than at the national level. Trust in the European Court of
Justice (the supreme court of the European Union) is higher than in the
national judiciary at low levels of trust at the national level, and smaller
at high levels of trust. Still, trust in the ECJ is higher in countries with a
highly trusted judiciary than in countries with a less trusted judiciary.
Keywords Trust · Judiciary · Public institutions · European Union ·
European Court of Justice
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6.1 Connection Between Independence and Trust
Several international surveys exist about trust in institutions. The Euro-
pean Commission has been organizing public opinion surveys for many
years. These surveys among the general public in the member states
of the EU record trust in national institutions including the national
“justice/legal system” and in EU institutions, including the European
Court of Justice (formally, the Court of Justice which as supreme court
constitutes together with the General Court the Court of Justice of the
European Union). While these surveys have as disadvantages that the
definition of the justice/legal system is imprecise, and that the answer
categories do not allow much distinctiveness (only three categories), the
breadth of the surveys makes them particularly relevant for this study. The
judiciary is the most important part of this potentially broader concept,
and, for ease of exposition, the ‘justice/legal system’ will be denoted by
the ‘judiciary’ in the sequel. As discussed in Chapter 2, trust in the judi-
ciary and perceptions of judicial independence by citizens are connected.
Applying the Eurobarometer survey on judicial independence and the
public opinion survey on trust in the judiciary, the correlation between
independence as perceived by citizens and trust by citizens, is 0.95. See
Table 6.1. The correlation between perceived independence by compa-
nies, which is more based on direct experience with the courts and rational
considerations than the perceptions of citizens, and trust of citizens is also
high. As discussed before, it is likely that a positive perception of indepen-
dence fosters trust in the judiciary, but reverse causality cannot be ruled
out: people may trust the judiciary, and therefore believe in and respect
its independence. For citizens independence of and trust in the judiciary
are connected to such an extent that both are not distinguishable: trust
in the judiciary seems to be foremost trust in the independence of the
judiciary. Given this connection, it is also of interest for the study of judi-
cial independence to compare the trust in the judiciary with the trust in
the other branches of the state. It will be shown that independence and
impartiality play a role in the trust of citizens in the other state powers as
well. Two levels of institutions will be examined, national and European
Union.
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6.2 Trust in National Institutions
Trust in the three powers of the state differs widely among the countries
of the EU (see also Sapignoli 2018). According to the public opinion
surveys of the EC, trust varies from Croatia, where an extremely low
percentage of 17% of the respondents tends to trust the judiciary and
an even lower 13% both of the other state powers, to Finland, where 86%
tends to trust the judiciary, 64% parliament and 56% the government. Not
surprisingly, the outcomes for the three powers of the state are correlated.
Still, substantial differences exist. Table 6.2 provides the summary data.
The surveys show that in the mean trust in the national judiciary is higher
than in the national parliament and the national government. According
to the opinion surveys of the EC, higher trust in the judiciary than in
parliament and government is found in most countries: in 16 out of the
25 EU-members that are included in this analysis. This is the case in all
vested democracies, excluding Portugal and including Greece, while in
Central Europe the Czech republic, Romania and Estonia exhibit this
pattern. The gap between trust in the judiciary and that in the other
powers of the state is often large in these countries, with the UK having
an extreme gap of 38%-point. The decision making process on Brexit
has reduced trust in both government and parliament, and only the judi-
ciary is left standing. In most (12) of these 16 countries parliament and
government are trusted to the same extent. However, in Scandinavia trust
in Parliament is higher than in government. The reverse is seen only in
the Czech republic. Apparently, in vested democracies trust is not evenly
distributed among the state powers. This pattern is found in national
surveys as well. For example for the Netherlands where each quarter trust
in a range of institutions is measured (Dekker and Den Ridder 2020),
and in Germany (Vaterrodt et al. 2018).
In contrast to the main pattern, in many countries of Central Europe
and also in Portugal, in total 8 countries, the trust in the judiciary is
equal to the trust in both other state powers (4 countries) or equal to the
trust in one of them and higher than that in the other (four countries).
A situation where trust in the judiciary falls below trust in the other state
powers is only and only weakly found in Slovenia where 26% tends to
trust the judiciary, 31% Parliament and 35% government. Based on older
data, Grönlund and Setälä (2012) finds similarly that trust in the legal
system is larger than in parliament, except for Spain and Slovenia, based
on the European Social Survey. Considering the two groups of countries
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together, it is quite obvious that the pattern of relatively high trust in the
judiciary generally goes together with a relatively high level of trust in the
other two institutions.
As noted before, in a democracy the press plays a vital role in reporting
about the functioning of the branches of government which is not directly
observable by the general public, but the media can also be under the
influence of the government or parliament, directly or indirectly. Media
under the influence of the judiciary have not been observed yet. On
average 50% of the respondents tend to trust the judiciary. The same
percentage is found for the press. The cross country variation of trust
in the judiciary is somewhat larger than of trust in the press. Higher
trust in the judiciary than in the press or equal trust is predominantly
found in established democracies with Belgium, Italy and Portugal as
exceptions. This is neither good nor bad, except when differences are
extreme. Extreme more trust in the judiciary than in the press is found
for the UK (difference of 29%-point), Ireland (17%), Denmark (22%) and
Greece (26%). The reverse is found for Croatia (24%), Slovakia (18%) and
Portugal (17%). These outcomes lead to interesting questions about the
impact of reporting in the press on trust. It could well be that negative
reporting (“enemies of the people”) reduces the trust in the judiciary, but
even more the trust in the press itself.
To check whether this pattern is specific for Europe, a comparison can
be made with the United States where confidence of the general public in
public institutions is measured as well. In 2019 the confidence in the judi-
ciary stood at 69% for the US Supreme Court, 65% for the State Court
system and 65% for the Federal court system (percentage of the respon-
dents that answer that they have a great deal or some confidence; GBAO
2020). These levels of trust are higher than the European mean, and are
comparable with the figure for Germany. Only in Scandinavia and the
Netherlands trust in het judiciary is higher than the mean for the US.
The comparison at the state level is most relevant here. Confidence in
the State Courts (65%) is higher than in the State Legislature (58%) and
Governor (59%). The differences are, however, smaller than in the EU.
Thus, the same phenomenon is observed in the US, but in less extreme
form than in the EU. It should be noted that in the US while the confi-
dence in the judiciary increased since the start of the current surveys eight
years ago until 2018, it sharply declined in 2019 (from 76 to 65%). The
same happened to the other branches of government, but the decline hit
the courts harder (Governor from 60 to 59% and State legislature from
65 to 58%).
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Switching to the development over time over a longer period, since
2004, the first year when most current EU members participated in
the survey, trust in the judiciary has increased on average with 20%.
In contrast, trust in parliament declined with 6%, and in govern-
ment it increased a little with 3%. Trust in the press increased over
the whole period with 9%. Developments within the EU have been
uneven. Departing from the average are in particular, negatively, Greece
(judiciary: −13% decline, parliament: −36%, Government: −31%),
Croatia (−7%, −12%, −13%), Spain (−2%, −24%, −26%), Romania
(+13%, −10%, −19%), UK (+7%, −18%, −13%) and France (+13%, −
11%, −2%), and positively: the Netherlands (+22%, +15%, +25%), Poland
(+21%, +24%, +25%) and Sweden (+19%, +15%, +17%). These patterns
are largely unsurprising, as they reflect the impact of the banking and
sovereign debt crises that worked out differently across countries, and
specific events such as Brexit. The results for Poland are intriguing, as
they do not presage the current backsliding. Poland was one of the
frontrunners in the accession to the EU and thereby in reforming its
government/governance structure (Coman 2014).
These outcomes could easily lead to the conclusion that of the three
branches of the state the judiciary is trusted the most. However, matters
are more complicated. The public opinion surveys of the Eurobarometer
also ask the public whether they tend to trust the public administration
and the regional and local authorities in their country. Also trust in the
police is regularly surveyed. See Table 6.3.
Average percentages of those who tend to trust institutions across
countries are much the same for the judiciary, public administration and
regional and local public authorities. In only seven countries the trust in
the legal system is substantially higher than in both other public sector
institutions. This group is dominated by North Western European coun-
tries. In all other countries trust is equal and more often lower than in
the other institutions. The trust in the police (70% on average) is much
higher than in the judiciary.1 Only in Austria police and judiciary rank the
same.
The conclusion is that the trust in the judiciary differs from trust in
government and parliament but not from the trust in, what is called,
the public administration and regional and local public authorities. It
1In the US confidence in the local police is expressed by 77% of the respondents in
2019, down from 89% in 2018. The difference in 2019 between state judiciary and police
is smaller than in the EU (12 vs 18%-point).
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is not self-evident how the respondents interpret “the government” and
“the public administration”. It seems likely that public administration is
primarily seen as the implementer of public policies and the provider of
public services. This reflects the classic distinction between policy devel-
opment and policy implementation: the first is political, and the second
should ideally be a political and impartial, being subject to judicial review.
This separation from politics is made explicit for autonomous agencies
and in particular for regulators that, largely stemming from EU-law, are
fully independent from national political institutions, and whose indepen-
dence is protected by the judiciary. Grönlund and Setälä (2012) make a
distinction between representative institutions and institutions primarily
responsible for implementing laws (in particular the judiciary), and argue
that representative institutions require a certain level of distrust (see also
Warren 1999).
If correct, the public administration is less political than the govern-
ment, and has the potential to be more trustworthy for a broader
spectrum of the population than the political institutions of government
and parliament. Although less clear-cut, the same reasoning could apply
to regional and local public authorities that provide local services. Given
the strong connection between independence and trust with regard to
the judiciary, it is conceivable that related concepts such as fairness and
impartiality play a role in the minds of the respondents with respect to the
other institutions. Of course, the independence of the judiciary is funda-
mental and guaranteed by formal safeguards, while the position of the
public administration is ambivalent (Papadopoulos 2013). Still, the same
values as to the application of rules may be shared: whatever the rules,
people need to be treated equally. However, the reasoning can also work
the other way around. The fact that the extent to which the judiciary is
trusted does not differ much from the trust in the public administration,
can also be caused by the judiciary not being as independent as it should
be. A further consideration is that in a national context the judiciary may
be part of a legal/judicial system that is not supported by all political
parties, and, consequently, it is drawn into the political field.
To summarize, the nature of the mission of the judiciary, including
the impartial interpretation of the law and protection of rights, can be
expected to (but need not always) foster trust more easily than the polit-
ical system can or even should. A normative conclusion that the judiciary
functions “better” than political institutions is not warranted. The judi-
ciary is more akin to public administration than to political institutions,
and a comparison with the public administration is more informative.
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6.2.1 Trust, Knowledge and Politicization
Citizens can and do distinguish the judiciary from political institutions
(the government, the parliament), but does the general public see a
difference between the judiciary and other public institutions? Are the
institutions the same in terms of trust, as suggested above, or are citizens
not aware of the differences? The rule of law survey of the EC that is
discussed in Chapter 3 shows that knowledge about the judiciary does
not go deep. At best, citizens have a general understanding of what the
judiciary is about. As a result, people who do not have direct or indirect
experience with the courts, fall back on their institutional trust in (the
non-political part of) the public sector in general or even their disposi-
tional trust (see Chapter 2). This lack of specific understanding about the
judiciary could also (partly) explain why citizens who are lay judges have
a very different, much more positive perception of judicial independence
than citizens in general (Chapter 4).
The awareness of the public of the specific role and position of the
judiciary is likely to be time and location dependent. In stable times citi-
zens may be only superficially aware of the judiciary and its independence.
It is, however, difficult to imagine that in Poland the struggle between
judiciary and government has gone unnoticed to the general public. In
Poland trust in the judiciary is roughly at the same level as trust in govern-
ment and parliament, and much lower than in the public administration
and the regional and local public authorities (37% versus 47% and 56% in
June 2019). The politicization of the position of the judiciary in Poland
shows in these figures. If we extend the reasoning that the position of
the judiciary is likely to be politicized if trust in the judiciary falls short
of the trust in the public administration and the regional and local public
authorities, more countries are in this situation. For instance, Bulgaria,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania, but also Belgium display this pattern to
the same extent as Poland.
6.3 Trust in Multi-level Governance
The combination of the surveys about national institutions and EU insti-
tutions makes it possible to examine multi-level governance by comparing
trust in the supranational institutions with trust in the institutions at
the national level (see Arnold et al. 2012). In addition, the differences
between the trust in the same European institutions, in particular the
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European Court of Justice, by the citizens of the different member states
can be examined, and related to trust at the national level. Table 6.4
shows that on average across countries the differences in trust between
the state powers at the EU level are much smaller than at the national
level. The European Court of Justice and the European Commission are
actually indistinguishable trustwise, while the European Parliament stands
apart from the European Court of Justice. As above, this raises the ques-
tion whether respondents can differentiate between the EU institutions
in the way they do nationally. According to another component of the
public opinion surveys of the EC,2 most people are aware of the existence
of the European Parliament (93%), the European Commission (85%) and
the European Court of Justice (71%), while people are much less aware
of other EU institutions such as the European Ombudsman (41%) and
the Economic and Social Committee (40%). The European Central Bank
is well known as well (82%). Being aware is one thing, being able to
differentiate between the performance of the institutions is another, but
also the more technocratic nature of the EC than the political institu-
tions at the national level may have an impact. If the EC is seen more
as a public administration than national governments are, trust in the
EC would be higher than in national governments for this reason alone.
Table 6.4 shows also that the spread of outcomes for the national insti-
tutions among countries is much larger than for the corresponding EU
institutions. This is not surprising as the same EU institutions are evalu-
ated by the respondents, but of course in different ways across countries,
while the national institutions differ as such.
On average across countries the trust in the justice system at the EU
level is the same as at the national level, while the trust in the other state
powers is much lower nationally than at the EU level. This fits in with the
notion that the national courts and the ECJ and by extension the ECHR
form one judicial system with the rule of law at its core (“national judges
are European judges”).3 Its level of integration is higher than that of the
national governments and the EC as well as the national parliaments and
the EP.
2EC (2019). Public opinion, Awareness of the EU institutions. Data November 2019.
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index.
3E.g. Frans Timmermans, Vice President of the EC, on Twitter 21 February 2019.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 INDEPENDENCE AND TRUST 89
At the country level, high trust nationally combines with a lower level
of trust in the ECJ, and low trust nationally combines with higher trust
in the ECJ (see Fig. 6.1a). Still, countries with high trust nationally, have
more confidence in the ECJ than countries with low trust nationally. To
illustrate: if trust in national justice is smaller than 50%, then the trust in
the ECJ is higher than trust in national justice in 9 out of 12 countries,
in 2 equal and only in one country substantially lower (Czechia). If trust
is higher than 50%, in 12 out of 13 countries trust in the ECJ is lower
than in the national courts (Belgium is the exception). Trust in the ECJ
is higher in these countries than in the countries that have low trust in
their judiciaries (57% tends to trust the ECJ vs 44%).
In Fig. 6.1 the trust in the three state powers is mapped for the national
and the EU level. The logical consequence of the outcomes on trust
discussed so far is that only for the judiciary there is a tipping point (at
50%), where higher trust in the ECJ turns into lower trust than nationally.
For the other branches of government trust in the national institutions is
nearly always lower than or equal to the trust in the EU institutions.
These data are intriguing. National judiciaries command more trust than
the other state powers in their political manifestations. As we saw in the
previous section, this may have to do with the non-politicized nature of
their judicial tasks that allows broad trust to develop among the popula-
tion, but also with being embedded in an EU judicial system that from
the top of the ECJ and the ECHR tries to promote and protect the inde-
pendence and quality of the national judiciaries. This follows from their
judgments but also from their (moral) leadership role in Europe.
Whether the trust of the population of a country in the ECJ is helpful
in protecting judicial independence in countries with judiciaries that are
under pressure from government and parliament, is an open question. In
several of these countries the percentage of citizens that trust the ECJ
falls below 50%, and that level of support may not sway government
and parliament to implement unwelcome decisions of the ECJ. Nonethe-
less, the ECJ is likely to have a stabilizing influence on national judicial
systems.
6.4 Trust and Respect of Independence
In this chapter the very high correlation of independence as perceived
by citizens and their trust in the judiciary was discussed. In Chapter 3
the correlation between independence as perceived by judges and by citi-
zens was examined. The connection between these concepts and respect













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 INDEPENDENCE AND TRUST 91
for independence was not yet discussed. Table 6.5 gives the correlation
between respect for independence by the main actors on the one hand
and perceived independence and trust on the other hand.
While all correlations between variables at the national level are signif-
icant, respect for independence from parties and lawyers is particularly
connected with judicial independence and trust. As such, this does not
tell us anything about causality. However, respect for independence is
based on the perceptions of judges, and it is likely that causality runs
directly from their experience of respect for independence to their percep-
tions of independence. As to the connection between respect perceived by
judges and perceived independence by citizens and their trust in the judi-
ciary, causality is likely to run both ways. Parties, in particular, will be
more respectful for judges, the more they are convinced of their indepen-
dence and the more they trust them. At the same time, respect enhances
independence and thereby trust.
Respect for independence by parliament and government is less
strongly correlated with the perceptions of independence and trust, with
the media taking a position in the middle. Respect and legitimacy of
judges in the political field are less directly associated with the daily work
of judges in their court rooms. Respect for independence by the other
state powers has to do with matters of demarcation of responsibilities
and resource allocation, as discussed in Chapter 5. The correlation of the
Table 6.5 Pearson correlations between independence and respect for
independence as perceived by judges and independence and trust perceived by
citizens
Judges on Citizens on
Independence Independence Trust in
Judiciary
Trust in ECJ
Parties 0.82** 0.79** 0.86** 0.60**
Respect for Lawyers 0.88** 0.81** 0.84** 0.46*
independence
by:
Parliament 0.62** 0.60** 0.66** 0.41
Government 0.59** 0.53* 0.59** 0.40
Trad. media 0.72** 0.71** 0.76** 0.58**
Notes
1. 22 countries
2. All variables are scores between 0–10, except trust in judiciary and ECJ which are % of respondents
that tend to trust.
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trust in the ECJ and the respect shown by the court users emphasizes the
connectivity of the EU legal system.
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CHAPTER 7
Judiciary in Democracy: Alignment
andDisconnect
Abstract In this last Chapter, the consequences of differences in percep-
tions are examined. Two concepts are used: the lack of alignment and—
more extreme—the disconnect between judiciary and society. Ranking
countries by trust in the judiciary, in the lowest 20% there is a discon-
nect of judiciary and society, in the 20% around the median and in the
highest 20% there is lack of alignment. Disconnect and lack of align-
ment seem to be self-perpetuating, as judges do not perceive the state
of independence as problematic. Indications are that even a disconnect
does not reduce the use of the civil courts, but that it leads citizens to
avoid administrative law procedures. A disconnect weakens the position
of the judiciary within the trias politica. This reinforces the complicated
relationship between the judiciary and the other state powers. Where the
other state powers see an increasing influence of the judiciary, the judi-
ciary sees its own independence endangered. These perspectives clash. For
the judiciary the way out is to focus on access to justice as an alternative
perspective. By addressing the urgent legal needs of citizens, the judiciary
has the potential to improve its alignment with society and its position
within the trias politica.
Keywords Alignment · Disconnect · Judiciary · Democracy · Trias
politica
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7.1 Definition of Lack
of Alignment and Disconnect
In Chapter 3 it is shown that, while the perceptions of the indepen-
dence of judiciary by relevant groups are correlated across countries,
their perceptions differ in level. Who rates the judicial system on this
crucial dimension, makes a huge difference. The perceptions by judges
of their own independence are more positive than their perceptions of
the independence of the judges in general in their country, in turn these
perceptions are more positive than the perceptions of lawyers about judi-
cial independence and these again are (much) more positive than the
perceptions of the general public and that of companies. Also, level of
education has an impact on perceptions with citizens with low educa-
tion being less positive about judicial independence for medium and high
levels of independence. While the data about court users is scarce and
contradictory, it seems that experience lowers the perception of indepen-
dence further. This is consistent with research for the US that suggests
that for most people going to court is losing control over their situa-
tion, and that this loss of control as such leads to a negative experience
(Benesh 2006). In addition it was shown in Chapter 3 that winning or
losing plays a role, where losing is likely to get greater weight in the
minds of people than winning, resulting on balance in a negative effect
on perceived independence.
In Chapter 4 it is shown for a smaller set of countries that citizens who
act as lay judges have perceptions about the independence of lay judges
and of professional judges that are at the same level as the perceptions of
professional judges. Their perceptions are much more positive than those
of the highly educated general public. In the comparison of citizens as
lay judges and as parties, judging versus being judged is likely to play
an important role, and in the comparison of lay judges and the general
public direct experience versus indirect information. Large differences in
the perceptions of independence by judges including lay judges and the
perceptions of the public in general and the public as parties reflect a
lack of alignment between judiciary and society. A lack of alignment may
turn into a disconnect when judges are (highly) positive about their inde-
pendence and the public (highly) negative. In that case judges and those
(potentially) being judged differ fundamentally on the actual realization
of the core value of the judiciary. For citizens this is not (only) an abstract
matter about the division of powers within the state, but about getting a
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fair trial. As discussed in Chapter 2, independence is a key aspect of proce-
dural justice. Perceptions of independence, however, do not constitute the
full picture.
Low levels of perceived judicial independence by the public may go
together and may be exacerbated by lack of respect for independence
by court users (parties, lawyers, prosecutors), the political system (parlia-
ment, government and media) and/or leaders of the judiciary (highest
courts, governance bodies). Chapter 5 examines the perceptions of judges
about the respect their independence receives from these groups. It is
found that, according to the respondents, internal leaders respect the
independence of the judges most, court users less so but still a lot, and
the political system least. It is also shown that according to the judges
respect for independence of the respective groups is based on different
aspects of independence, related to the influence sphere of the respec-
tive actors. For instance, as to the parties, their respect is connected to
corruption and inappropriate pressure, while for government and parlia-
ment the connection is with case load (budget) and the implementation
of judgments that go against political interests. Combining perceptions
about independence and respect for independence, a disconnect between
judiciary and society is defined here as the combination of (1) positive
perceptions of judicial independence by judges and negative perceptions
by the general public, and (2) lack of respect for independence by the
court users and the political system.
Chapter 6 incorporates trust in the framework. As discussed in
Chapter 6, trust is a broad concept that can be applied to any function
or organization. It is much less specific than independence, and precisely
for that reason allows comparisons across institutions. For the judiciary
it was shown that trust and independence are highly correlated to such
an extent that trust in the judiciary equals trust in the independence
of the judiciary. It was argued that independence or—more precisely—
autonomy plays a role in government in general. Government consists
of highly political policy making and more neutral policy implementa-
tion which is often executed by seperate organizations such as more or
less autonomous agencies (see Chapter 2). For these latter organizations,
impartiality and independence are important values, and they may even
end up in court if they do not abide by these values. Trust in this public
administration is likely to have a similar content as trust in the judiciary.
For the political part of government and for parliament trust has neces-
sarily another meaning, and, while it may contain neutral elements such as
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politicians handling crises competently, partisan aspects are part of it. For
instance, politicians are expected by their constituencies to do what they
promised to do at elections. This will be valued by their constituencies
but not by other voters. As a consequence it is only logical that trust in
government and parliament cannot reach the level of that of the judiciary,
as long as the judiciary is not politicized itself. This is borne out by the
data. In all well-established democracies trust in the judiciary is higher
than in parliament and government. Thus, while at first sight equality
of trust in the three powers of the state would seem desirable from a
perspective of balance, equality cannot be the goal. For the judiciary an
aspiration level would be to score higher than the public administration.
In the mean across countries this is realized.
7.2 Alignment in Groups of Countries
Ordering the countries by means of one of the variables, trust in the
(national) judiciary, three groups of countries are selected to examine the
interaction of the perception variables at different levels of performance:
the lowest 20%, the highest 20% and 20% symmetric around the median.
Table 7.1 presents the results. In the lowest group trust in the judiciary
is at the level of the other powers of the state, and is far below trust
in public administration and regional and local public authorities. In the
countries concerned trust in the judiciary at the EU-level is much higher
than in the judiciary at the national level, but this does not seem to give
the ECJ the trust that makes it politically risky for national government
and parliament to ignore its judgments (see also Chapter 2). In these
countries judges and lawyers are positive about judicial independence, but
the general public is not. Neither are the parties. Citizens with a high
education are even more negative about independence than citizens with
a low education. This is remarkable. Citizens with a low education may
be more susceptible to influence of the other state powers that in these
countries show little respect for judicial independence. Not only respect
by government and parliament is low, also in the court room respect by
parties and lawyers is often not present.1 This group of countries provides
a clear case of the judiciary being disconnected from society. The situation
1The score in Table 7.1 for respect by court users in the lowest trust group corresponds
to 57% of the responding judges (strongly) agreeing that their independence is respected,
16% disagreeing and 27% is uncertain.
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Table 7.1 Trust, perceived independence and respect for independence for
three groups of countries
Lowest trust Middle trust Highest trust
Trust by general public (% that tends to
trust) in:
National judiciary 26.6% 49.6% 80%
Average parliament and government 24.2% 33.7% 60.8%
Average public administration and
regional/local authorities
37.9% 52.1% 71.0%
European Court of Justice 44.8% 46.8% 65.6%
Perceived judicial independence (score
0–10) by:
Judges (about independence of all judges) 7.1 8.0 9.1
Lawyers 5.9 6.0 8.0
General public 3.9 5.5 7.3
General public high education 3.8 5.6 7.6
General public low education 4.3 5.2 6.4
Parties 3.6 5.2 6.8
Respect for judicial independence perceived
by judges (score 0–10) of:
Court users (average parties and lawyers) 6.5 7.4 8.6
Political system (average parliament,
government and media)
5.2 5.8 7.5
Court management 7.7 8.2 8.9
Notes
Lowest 20%: BG, HR, LT, SK, SL
Middle 20%: BE, CZ, EL, HU, LT
Highest 20%: AT, DK, FI, NL, SW
of these countries seems to be stable in a negative equilibrium, as there
are no strong forces that pull towards judicial independence.
At the other end of the spectrum, nearly all variables point to a stable
equilibrium as well, but then at a high level of trust and independence.
In terms of trust, the courts outperform not only the other state powers
but also the less-political public sector institutions. In addition, the link
with the EU is relatively strong. Even if a government would be tempted
to ignore judgments of the ECJ, this would likely meet resistance from
within society, and could be risky for the government. Perceptions of
independence by the respective groups are all positive. However, the
perceptions of independence by parties and citizens with a low educa-
tion are not as positive as the other outcomes would lead to expect. As
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a result, also in these countries the difference between judges and the
general public and, in particular, the part that has little education is large.
Thus, even the best performing judiciaries are not aligned with society.
While the judiciary plays its role in a capable manner, its high self-esteem
may cause it to be complacent, and as a result not deeply interested in the
court users or the developments society is undergoing. This complacency
shows in the lack of court user surveys (only two of the five countries
in this group conduct such surveys) and, for instance, slow adaptation
to digital and on-line communication, as a result of which courts also in
these countries were cornered by the COVID 19 pandemic (ELI 2020).
In the middle, there is a diverse range of countries that seem to be in a
less stable situation. Trust in the judiciary is well above trust in the other
two branches of government, but just falls short of the public administra-
tion, and it is in an absolute sense low. The link with the European level
is weak, and does not differ much from the lowest group. Perceived inde-
pendence by citizens with low education and parties is only marginally
positive, and differs starkly from the views of the judges. Respect for inde-
pendence by the political system is low. These countries are likely to be
evolving, either positively or negatively. Hungary and, before the detri-
mental reforms, Poland are cases in point of negative evolution, while
Lithuania shows a positive evolution.
Figure 7.1a and b depict the essential data for all countries individu-
ally. If a difference smaller than 20% in perceived independence by judges
and public is required for a judiciary to be aligned with society (see
the dashed line in Fig. 7.1a), preciously few judiciaries live up to that
standard. A combination of positive perceptions by judges and negative
perceptions by the public occurs frequently. This happens in 9 countries.2
In addition to the countries in the lowest 20% group, this occurs in Italy,
Portugal, Spain and Romania. Figure 7.1b addresses respect for indepen-
dence, and exhibits results for two actors, one from the category of court
users (parties) and the other from the political system (parliament). The
scores reflect the percentages of judges that feel their independence is
(not) respected. It is to some extent arbitrary at which score the indepen-
dence of the judiciary is seen to be not respected anymore. In the figure
demarcation lines are drawn at a score of 7, roughly corresponding with
2Positive: the score is larger than 5, Negative: the score is smaller than 5. The smallest
difference between a positive score by judges and a negative score by citizens is 23% (1.5
point).
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70% of the judges feeling respected. Using this criterion, few countries
are fully in the clear, in particular with regard to respect from parliament.
7.3 Causes of Disconnect and Lack of Alignment
Can disconnect and lack of alignment be attributed to general causes?
Two scenarios were suggested in Chapter 3. The alternative storylines
were—briefly summarized—either the judiciary being overly confident or
society overly critical. To review the evidence collected so far, in Chapter 3
the comparison of citizens and companies with and without experience
with disputes at the courts was examined. For citizens the data show a
lower appreciation of independence by citizens with than without expe-
rience. This does not bode well for the judiciary. However, it was also
shown that views become more extreme, suggesting in particular that
parties that lose their cases tend to have a (more) negative appreciation of
independence. In combination with the general argument that going to
court is not a positive experience as parties have to surrender control, it
seems that the perceptions of the parties are overly negative. In Chapter 4
it was concluded that lay judges have similar perceptions about inde-
pendence as professional judges. Albeit for a relatively small number of
countries, the perceptions of lay judges give credence to the perceptions
of judges.
From the data about the respect for independence it can be concluded
that in the mean a large majority of judges feels their independence
respected by the court users (see Fig. 7.1b for the parties to lawsuits).
This as well as the respect for independence by court leaders is consistent
with the positive perception of independence by judges. Judges experi-
ence less respect by the political system including the media. Thus, at
system level there are more tensions than at the day-to-day work in the
courts. The opinion of the general public is likely to be affected by media
and politics. In particular if judges focus on their daily work as they are
prone to do and which is where independence eventually materializes,
they have the arguments on their side to be more positive about judicial
independence than the general public. To conclude, judiciary and society
are generally not aligned and in several countries there is an outright
disconnect, but the judiciary is substantially more independent that the
general public realizes. We conclude that both story lines are needed to
explain the observed differences, but the relative contribution of both is
difficult to assess.
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7.4 Consequences of Disconnect
and Lack of Alignment
Disconnect and lack of alignment may reduce the willingness of parties to
bring cases to court. One would expect that in these circumstances plain-
tiffs in disputes more often either give up their claims altogether or try to
find alternatives that are more trustworthy. Of course, they would need
to convince defendants to agree with such a course. This is often difficult
to achieve. At the other end of the spectrum, it is likely that indepen-
dent courts that are not swayed by specific interests of any kind, are more
consistent in their interpretation of the law, and their judgments can be
predicted accurately. Therefore, it would be relatively easy to convince
defendants to negotiate out of court and to settle, and there would be no
reason to go to court.
The most relevant type of case to examine here are civil cases, as these
cases leave choice to the parties and have some homogeneity across juris-
dictions. To give a first impression of the data, as gathered by CEPEJ, the
countries in the 20% lowest group of trust have 2.9 civil litigious cases
per 100 inhabitants, and the highest group 0.68 civil cases.3 It seems that
in the countries that experience a disconnect people go to court abun-
dantly, despite their misgivings about the independence of the judiciary.
The same phenomenon has been observed for Russia (Hendley 2013).
These figures do not prove, of course, that a disconnect leads to high
case load, as many other variables play a role. Other factors such as dispo-
sition time and availability of alternatives, but also cultural factors like
conflict handling behaviour need to be controlled for. For the present
analysis it has to suffice that a disconnect does not dominate the actual
use of the civil courts. The data of CEPEJ on administrative law show an
inverted pattern with 0.22 cases per 100 inhabitants for the 20% lowest
group versus 0.76 cases for the 20% highest bracket.4 This suggests that
in these countries people avoid litigating against the state. However, the
scope of administrative law differs among countries, and an in-depth anal-
ysis is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn. That there are issues
in administrative law or more in general with cases against government,
is shown in the latest judges survey of the ENCJ (2019). The survey
3CEPEJ (2018, Fig. 5.5) (no data on Bulgaria).
4CEPEJ (2018, Fig. 5.23).
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includes the statement that judgments that went against the interests of
the government were usually implemented/enforced in the country of the
respondent. In the lowest bracket of trust 23% does not agree with the
statement and 52% is not sure, while in the 20% highest bracket 12% does
not agree and 31% is not sure.5 Thus, when one wins a case against the
government, the chances that the government will honour the judgment
are much lower in the former than in the latter countries. This reduces
the incentive to go to court. This issue is broader than the lowest bracket,
as in the middle group these percentages were 25% and 43%.
At the system level, lack of alignment and disconnect, in particular,
weaken the position of the judiciary in the trias politica, and this may have
diverse consequences ranging from insufficient allocation of resources,
politicized appointments to governance bodies of the judiciary, taking
tasks away from the judiciary and, as just noted, refusal by govern-
ment to implement judgments. A disconnect may also make it easier for
governments to succeed in policies towards illiberal democracy, including
reforms of judiciaries to bring them under the control of government
or parliament. After all, governments do not have to fear large popular
support for the judiciary and its independence. In the multi-level gover-
nance system of the EU, resistance will come from the EU institutions
and currently, in particular, from the ECJ that, as was shown, is trusted
more than national judiciaries, but probably not enough to have decisive
influence.
A disconnect but also a milder lack of alignment is likely to be self-
perpetuating, as judiciaries do not see much need for connection with
society, accountability, change and innovation, while society gets more
frustrated by the lack thereof. To illustrate diverging sense of urgency,
in the recent surveys among judges and lawyers it is found, for instance,
that on the question whether judicial corruption is effectively addressed
by the judicial authorities in the respondent’s country a large difference
exists between what judges and what lawyers answer.6 For the 20% lowest
bracket of trust, 12% of judges and 53% of lawyers give a negative answer
and for the 20% highest bracket 2% of judges and 14% of lawyers. This
does not show much recognition among judges of the urgency of change
seen by lawyers, in particular, in the lowest 20% bracket.
5ENCJ (2019, Fig. 10).
6ENCJ (2019, Fig. 34) and ENCJ/CCBE (2019, Fig. 20).
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7.5 Judiciary in a Democracy
An important component of the lack of alignment and disconnect of
the judiciary with society is the complicated relationship between the
state powers. As discussed, many judges feel that their independence is
not respected. The background of the tensions between the branches of
government can be found in long term developments. The judiciary oper-
ates on the one hand at the micro level of the day to day adjudication of
the many disputes involving citizens and/or businesses, and on the other
hand at the macro level of fundamental decisions that affect government,
its responsibilities and the boundaries it cannot transgress. Because of
these fundamental decisions, the way the judiciary is perceived and treated
by the other state powers cannot be separated from the changes democ-
racies in Europe are going through in their relation with the judiciary.
Depending on the trend one focusses on, there are several perspectives
on the development of European democracies. From a political perspec-
tive, the worldwide trend of the gradually increasing influence of the
courts on political decision-making, so-called ‘judicialization’, is particu-
larly relevant. This long-term trend is generally interpreted as an ongoing
transfer of power from the organs of representative democracy to judi-
ciaries (see e.g. the review by Hirschl 2009). The increasing reach of
constitutional courts is an important component of this trend, but also the
regular administrative and civil courts have a growing impact on govern-
ment policies. One of the multiple causes is the increasing importance
of fundamental rights and freedoms and law in general. Constitutional
democracy replaces popular democracy (Mény and Surel 2002): political
decisions are subject to judicial review and the leeway of politicians is
reduced. The development of the European Union with its far reaching
regulations and creation of independent European and national regula-
tors, is a major factor. As national judges enforce European law and in that
sense can not only rhetorically be called European judges,7 the national
judiciaries are seen as reducing the degrees of freedom of national poli-
tics. While politicians have committed themselves earlier to EU rules and
regulations, the judiciary holds them to that commitment. Judicialization
is part of a broader trend of “the rise of the unelected” (Vibert 2007).
The agencification that was briefly discussed in Chapter 2 is part of this
7E.g., “National judges are European judges and they oversee the application of EU
law”. Vice-president of the EC, Timmermans, on Twitter 21 February 2019.
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trend (Verhoest 2017). The ubiquitous creation of independent national
regulators goes well beyond granting autonomy to agencies that remain
under the direction of ministers. Their formal safeguards of independence
are similar to those of the judiciary (OECD 2016), and they derive much
of their position and power from the judiciary (OECD 2017). Another
example of declining influence of national politicians is the position of the
national Central Banks that in as far as community tasks (such as mone-
tary policy) are concerned, are independent. Their independence has been
arranged in a detailed manner, and forbids, for instance, the giving of
instructions to the governors of the Bank. Recourse to a court is often
possible if a Bank feels its independence is breached. The president of a
national Central Bank can, for instance, appeal against his/her dismissal
to the ECJ, while other members of decisions making bodies can address
a national court (ECB 2018).
These developments are experienced by politicians as a threat to
representative democracy. In particular, populist politicians who oppose
Europeanization regularly express fear of rule by judges (using terms
such as government of judges, juristocracy, courtocracy, dikastocracy and
kritocracy), but discomfort about loss of influence to the judiciary is
broader among politicians than only the populist right and left. This
judicialization happens at a time when representative democracy is under
internal pressures, for instance due to the changing nature of political
parties and their leadership (Papadopoulos 2013). In the context of this
book, it should be noted that judicialization presupposes that the judi-
ciary is ‘reasonably independent’ (Hirschl 2009, p 130). This brings us
to the second perspective.
In a rule of law perspective, one can see the judiciary and in particular
its independence under threat from politicians who have in many ways a
strong grip on the judiciary and who do not want to relinquish that grip.
Where this grip was relinquished in the past, politicians often yearn to get
it back. If one examines the Justice Scoreboard of the EC and the indica-
tors of independence and accountability of the ECNJ, the impression one
gets of the judiciary is a conglomerate of judges that is in many respects
dependent on the other state powers, even in some countries for the day
to day management of the courts (EC 2020; ENCJ 2020; van Dijk and
Vos 2018). Even in countries in which the judiciary is an autonomous
organization, it is often heavily dependent on government and parliament
for budget and for appointments to leadership positions, for instance,
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at Councils for the Judiciary (e.g. Torres Pérez 2019 on Spain). Pres-
sure on the judiciary has also a public communication component: in the
media the critique of lack of democratic legitimacy is often levelled against
the judiciary when judgments are not welcome. In Central and Eastern
European countries at the accession to the Union the independence of
the judiciary was often well arranged, and this shows in the indicators of
the ENCJ, mentioned above. These judiciaries have stronger formal safe-
guards than most countries in Western Europe that traditionally operate
on the basis of mutual trust and respect. In several of the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe politicians try to recapture the grip that they
relinquished (Coman 2014; Kovács and Scheppele 2018; Sterk and van
Dijk 2019). Their authoritarian leaders call the resulting form of govern-
ment illiberal democracy. Especially in these countries, judiciaries feel
threatened. In other countries there is often a feeling within the judi-
ciary of being kept short by the other state powers, also literally in terms
of caseloads and budgets. The judiciaries of Europe brace themselves
against an often combined power block of government and parliament
to maintain their independence.
In a access to justice perspective, the focus is on the day-to-day plight of
ordinary people and businesses seeking justice. In all countries a substan-
tial part of their legal needs are not met (for a brief summary of the
extensive literature see OECD/WJP). If disputes have been resolved by
settlement or adjudication, many believe this resolution was not achieved
in a fair manner. In addition, in many judiciaries (larger) court cases take
a long time, are costly and are administratively complicated, partly due to
lagging ICT-systems. In this perspective the judiciary is an important part
of conflict resolution chains which it ideally guides by a clear and uniform
application of the law. As a result people would not have to go to court
in most cases. Procedural justice plays, next to access to justice, a central
role in this approach: not only in cases of citizens against government but
in all party configurations. Procedural justice requires judges in each case
to be independent and to convey this to the parties and, if the case is of
sufficient interest, to the media and society in general.
Obviously, the first two perspectives collide, leading at best to misun-
derstandings between politicians who only see an empowered judiciary
that they do not consider in need of strengthening further, and a judi-
ciary that sees its—often already limited—independence under threat by
reform proposals and by mundane issues like insufficient budgets. At its
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worst this leads to power struggles that spill over to the EU level. Govern-
ment and parliament on the one side and the judiciary on the other side
feel threatened by each other. The relatively low scores on respect for
judicial independence by the political system, as perceived by the judi-
ciary, testify to this from the perspective of the judiciary. In this context,
a beauty contest about who is trusted the most, is not helpful and, as was
discussed in Chapter 6, beside the point. One may wonder what is the
way out of this situation.
In this Chapter the conclusion was reached that judiciaries are charac-
terized by a lack of alignment or even a disconnect with society. This
shows in particular in very diverse views of judges and citizens about
judicial independence, and in case of a disconnect by positive percep-
tions of independence by judges and negative perceptions by citizens, as
well as low respect of independence by the court users and the political
system. Lack of alignment and disconnect are to some extent a reflec-
tion of the above collision. Both are also connected to lack of knowledge
in society about the judiciary which was shown by the much more posi-
tive perceptions of independence by knowledgeable lay judges than by
ordinary (even highly educated) citizens. Judiciaries perform better than
the public is aware of. Still, these reasons cannot fill the whole gap in
perceptions between judges and the rest of society. Within the judiciary,
the reason must be sought in a generally weak orientation on the court
users. While many courts perform well in this respect by sticking to their
core values, feedback mechanisms are hardly anywhere established. In
Chapter 3 the weak court user orientation that speaks from the scarcity of
court user surveys was discussed. Guaranteeing that people get real access
to justice, irrespective of their background and that of the other parties
in judicial proceedings, is not at the forefront in most courts. This affects
the appreciation of the public for the courts and can easily lead to a nega-
tive perception of independence and low trust. In addition, it weakens the
position of the judiciary in the debate with politicians, as judges cannot
count on much support from the population.
Therefore, the third perspective of access to justice is important for
society and judiciary. This perspective as such is likely to be less contro-
versial than the other perspectives, despite its reliance on the rule of law
in every-day cases. It requires constructive co-operation within conflict
resolution chains in order to empower people to resolve disputes them-
selves on the basis of adequate information or assistance, and, secondary,
to unburden the courts of cases that are trivial from a legal point of view.
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To let such chains work smoothly, courts have to be consistent and fast.
And they must be truly independent, and make sure that the parties and
everybody else involved are fully aware of that. In this way, the judiciary
will better connect with society, and it will, indirectly, promote its inde-
pendence. Building broad public support by promoting and guaranteeing
access to justice, including fair trial, is not only essential to maintain the
authority of the judge in the court room, but also to maintain the position
of the judiciary in the political arena.
However, the positive perception of their independence by most judges
that emerged from the surveys, leads inadvertently to a low urgency to
improve performance and image. This rather myopic attitude in a further
broad minded group of professionals is one of the striking characteris-
tics of the judiciary (see for the US Rottman and Tomkins 1999). As
mentioned already, it would be helpful if judges became more interested
in the experiences of the court users, in particular with regard to funda-
mental issues as independence and impartiality. A far sighted approach
would to be to try and bring the perceptions of the court users and citi-
zens in general together with those of the judges. Exactly in view of the
importance of avoiding the appearance of dependence and partiality, the
reduction of differences in perceptions is advisable, even if this means
adjusting the perceptions of the judges downward.
Returning to the interaction of the powers of the state, it was suggested
earlier in this Chapter, based on the data presented, that the outcome may
or may not be that the judiciary of a country is in a stable equilibrium. A
stable equilibrium seems to occur at a high or at a low level of—in combi-
nation—perceived independence, respect for independence and trust in
the judiciary. If a stable system is out of equilibrium for instance due
to temporary negative events such as a deep economic crisis or positive
events such as large external support, it will return after some time to
its former equilibrium. The judiciaries that were classified as stable are
not easy to get permanently out of balance. When in a positive balance,
this is a desirable characteristic, but in a negative equilibrium, this is not.
A disconnect between judiciary and society, that characterizes a negative
equilibrium, is hard to overcome. In-between there are countries of which
the powers of the state do not seem to be in equilibrium. Large improve-
ments and large deteriorations in the rule of law occur and may even
alternate. Poland and Hungary are examples of countries in which polit-
ical leaders were able to change the judicial institutions radically, despite
elaborate legal safeguards and despite being embedded in the European
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Union. These upheavals follow from the clash of perspectives that was
discussed above. A long term defence against such upheavals is a sharp
focus of the judiciary on delivering justice for the population, and to build
popular support.
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